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Using financial institution mergers as exogenous shocks to common ownership, we find that stock prices 
of commonly held firms incorporate future earnings news more efficiently and are less sensitive to noise 
traders. We identify two potential mechanisms: (1) information diffusion between connected firms, and (2) 
active trading by common owners. We find that the investment sensitivity to Tobin’s Q for commonly held 
firms is higher, indicating that managers of such firms rely more on market prices for information. Our 
findings suggest that common ownership has a positive effect on information production and influences 
real corporate decision by improving price informativeness. 
 




Over the period from 1950 to 2010, institutional investors’ average percentage holdings in U.S. public 
companies increased from seven to sixty-seven percent.1 This remarkable growth in institutional ownership 
was fueled in part by the fierce push towards passive investing through exchange-traded funds (ETF), as 
well as the growth in active investing by large institutions. As a result, firms are now frequently 
interconnected through a diverse group of institutional investors with varying incentives and risk 
preference, and differing levels of information capabilities. 
One of the consequences of the growth of institutional investing is the increasing prevalence of 
common ownership. Common owners are institutional investors who hold large ownership stakes in 
multiple companies in the same industry. Figure 1 plots the average percentage holdings owned by common 
owners over the period 1980-2013. The figure reveals that common ownership grew from nearly zero 
percent in 1980 to approximately ten percent in 2013. In tandem with the rise in common ownership, 
researchers have begun to scrutinize the effects of common ownership on product markets and show that 
the investment styles of common owners cause firms to increase coordination and reduce competition 
(Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu 2018; He and Huang 2017). Further, regulators are currently investigating the 
effects of common ownership on capital markets and calling for new rules that are intended to help protect 
investors and consumers.2 
In this paper, we focus on the capital market implications of common ownership. Specifically, we 
examine whether common ownership improves the informational efficiency of stock prices, and influences 
managers’ investment decisions. While the effects of common ownership at the product market level have 
                                                             
1 https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch041913laahtm.  
2  On December 6th, 2018, Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner Robert J. Jackson Jr., in his 
testimony to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), characterized common ownership as “an investor protection 
problem” and urged “the SEC to pursue new rules requiring clearer summary disclosure of the voting behavior of 
institutional investors relative to other voters’ views on corporate elections.” For a full transcript of Commissioner’s 
testimony, visit https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/jackson-testimony-ftc-120618. Further, the FTC, and the 




been explored, there is scant evidence on the capital market implications of common ownership. We aim 
to contribute to this growing literature by empirically testing whether share prices of companies become 
more or less efficient following an increase in common ownership. 
We argue that exogenous shocks to common ownership reduce information costs, which then 
contributes to an improvement in the overall efficiency of stock prices. Specifically, when an institution 
develops sizeable ownership in multiple companies that are subject to similar competitive and economic 
forces, the institution also experiences efficiency gains in private information production through 
economies of scale (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 2005). The efficiency gains come from common 
owners’ ability to rely on their information acquisition efforts for one company to produce information for 
peer companies, consequently lowering average information costs per security. The lower information costs 
that common owners face incentivizes them to acquire more information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) 
and/or information of higher quality (Verrecchia 1982), which in turn contributes to price informativeness.  
Further, we hypothesize that common owners’ information activities contribute to information 
diffusion between connected firms and thereby add to price informativeness. Many studies show that block-
holders have stronger incentives to gather costly information (Edmans 2009; Rubin 2007; Boehmer and 
Kelley 2009). Common owners, as block-holders in multiple companies in the same industry, frequently 
meet with analysts, directors, and managers, which helps them benefit from a constant influx of information 
about the companies that they are investigating as well as the peer companies (Azar, Schmalz and Tecu 
2018; McCahery, Sautner and Starks 2016). They, therefore, have greater opportunities to incorporate 
information about peer companies that can be helpful in evaluating the focal firm, relative to investors who 
lack significant ownership in peer companies. Hence, common owners’ trades are more likely to reveal the 
fundamental information of peer firms, contributing to the level of information diffusion between connected 
firms. 
In order to study the effects of common ownership on price informativeness, we identify financial 
institution mergers as a source of identification for common ownership and use the resulting changes in 
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ownership structures as exogenous shocks to common ownership (He and Huang 2017). The goal of this 
identification strategy is to isolate our analysis from the effects of changes in common ownership that 
coincide with, or result from, significant changes in firm fundamentals. Using this identification strategy, 
we begin our analysis by investigating the extent to which current returns reflect information about future 
earnings. Lundholm and Myers (2002) show that efficient stock prices “bring the future forward”, reflecting 
greater amount of future earnings news. To the extent that common ownership has a positive effect on price 
efficiency, we should observe that current stock returns of commonly held firms incorporate a greater 
amount of future earnings news. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms with positive shocks to 
common ownership experience an increase in the extent to which their share prices reflect future earnings 
information. We also find that the positive relation between current returns and current earnings is weaker 
for commonly held firms, suggesting that the relative importance of current earnings in explaining current 
returns diminishes as this information becomes reflected in share prices during the previous years. 
We, additionally, analyze an alternative measure of price efficiency: variance ratios.3 The premise 
of this analysis is that liquidity shocks subsequently revert, whereas fundamental information leads to 
permanent price changes (Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi 2018; Saffi and Sigurdsson 2011). If 
common owners are informed, then their trades should push stock prices to converge to their intrinsic 
values.4 We find that shocks to common ownership lead to a significant reduction in the variance ratio, 
suggesting that the extent to which share prices are influenced by noise traders and short-term liquidity 
shocks is reduced for stocks owned by common owners. 
One of the primary economic arguments underlying our hypotheses is that common owners use 
information that they acquire concerning peer companies to value the firm in question. We argue that this 
information acquisition strategy helps common owners reduce their average information cost per 
                                                             
3 We calculate the variance ratio as the absolute value of the ratio of the five-day return volatility to five times daily 
return volatility minus one. 




investment. Further, as a positive externality, this information strategy helps information flow more quickly 
across different securities. To the extent that common owners serve as a conduit for the flow of information, 
we should see a stronger improvement in price informativeness for shares of companies that are less 
informationally connected. We exploit geographical distance as a measure of the connectedness between 
companies to test whether common owners generate incremental informational benefit for companies that 
are less connected. Prior research shows that information spreads among geographically close investors or 
companies through word-of-mouth and social interactions (Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005; Hong, Kubik 
and Stein 2004, Hong, Kubik and Stein 2005). Further, companies that are located in industry-geographic 
clusters tend to have more efficient share prices (Engelberg, Ozoguz and Wang 2018) and are less costly 
for sell-side analysts to cover (Jennings, Lee and Matsumoto 2017). 5  Hence, companies that are 
geographically distant from each other are less likely to be informationally connected. We predict that in 
such circumstances, common owners possess greater opportunities to contribute to price informativeness 
by serving as a medium for information to flow across securities.  
We find empirical support for this prediction. When there is an exogenous shock to the level of 
common ownership for two companies that are geographically distant from each other, the effect of 
common ownership on price efficiency is significantly larger than its effect for two companies that are 
closely located. In addition, we use an alternative proxy for the level of connection between companies, 
namely Facebook Social Connectedness Index (SCI), which measures the social connection level between 
the areas where the two companies are headquartered. We find similar results using the SCI. The average 
efficiency gain attributable to common ownership is significantly higher for firms that are less socially 
connected. 
Our results also indicate that common ownership triggers an increase in the level of private 
information that is reflected in share prices. Specifically, we document a positive relation between PIN, 
                                                             
5 The key conclusion from these papers is that physical proximity enhances information spillovers among peer firms 
and reduces external users’ information collection and production costs. 
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which is a measure of informed trading, and exogenous shocks to common ownership. In addition, we show 
that average bid-ask spreads decline in response to increases in common ownership. The decline in bid-ask 
spreads amid increases in informed trading, although seemingly contradictory, is consistent with findings 
from recent research (Collin-Dufresne and Fos 2015; Kacperczyk and Pagnotta 2019). 
To further investigate the potential channels through which common owners affect market 
efficiency, we delve deeper into common owners’ trading activities. We begin by examining the relation 
between stock returns and institutional holding changes. Within this empirical framework, we test whether 
exogenous shocks to common ownership enhance the return-trade correlation, which would suggest that 
trades become more informative. We find that the trading activities of common owners becomes 
significantly more correlated with contemporaneous returns for treatment firms following exogenous 
shocks to common ownership. These results show that increases in common ownership for treatment firms 
lead to more informative trading by common owners and highlights trading as one of the mechanisms 
through which common owners’ information gets incorporated into share prices. To further substantiate 
this conclusion, we conduct an additional analysis where we sort treatment firms into two groups: firms for 
which common owners actively trade and firms with non-active trading. We find that the price efficiency 
obtained following an exogenous shock to common ownership is stronger for treatment firms with active 
trading compared to firms with non-active trading by common owners. 
The empirical relation that we document between common ownership and price efficiency 
produces a directly related question: do managers of companies with common ownership rely more on share 
prices to make investment decisions?6 We examine this research question within the investment sensitivity 
to Tobin’s Q framework. Specifically, we investigate whether investment-to-Q sensitivity increases after a 
firm experiences a positive shock to common ownership. We document a positive change in investment-
to-Q sensitivity following a shock to common ownership, suggesting that managers of commonly owned 
                                                             
6 Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) document that the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices is higher 
when stock prices are more informative. Edmans (2009), additionally, shows that informed trading by block holders 
induce efficient investment. 
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companies rely more on the information conveyed in share prices to make investment decisions, presumably 
because they recognize the incremental informativeness of share prices. 
We conduct a series of robustness tests to strengthen the statistical validity of our empirical 
analyses. As part of this effort, we first repeat our analyses using an alternative control group and find 
similar results. We then perform a falsification test where we re-estimate our main analyses using pseudo-
event dates that are set to be four years prior to actual merger dates. This analysis detects no statistical 
association between the false shocks to common ownership and price efficiency or investment-to-Q 
sensitivity. Finally, following Lewellen and Lowry’s (2019) suggestion, we exclude mergers that took place 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and find similar results. 
We contribute to the existing literature on several dimensions. First, our findings extend the stream 
of research on the implications of common ownership. Recent research shows that increases in common 
ownership trigger higher product prices (Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu 2018), lead to improved market share 
and operating profitability (He and Huang 2017), encourage more collaboration and diffusion of innovation 
among commonly held firms (Chemmanur, Shen, and Xie 2016; Kostovetsky and Manconi 2016), and 
increase voluntary disclosure (Park et al. 2019; Pawliczek and Skinner 2018). These findings, collectively, 
suggest that an increase in common ownership weakens industry-wide competition and boosts managers’ 
willingness to cooperate with peer companies, while it encourages commonly held firms to disclose more. 
Further, several papers examine the effect of common ownership on corporate governance. He, Huang, and 
Zhao (2019), for example, find common ownership increases active voting. Anton et al. (2016) study the 
effect of common ownership on the executive compensation, while Edmans, Levit, and Reilly (2016) argue 
that common ownership strengthens governance through channels of both voice and exit. The central 
contribution of our paper is to show that one of the consequences of common ownership is an increase in 
price efficiency. We attribute the increase in efficiency to the reduction in information costs and improved 
information diffusion between companies, which manifest in more informed trading, particularly by 
common owners.  
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Second, our paper extends prior work that investigates the effects of institutional investors, 
especially ETF holders, on share price efficiency. A growing body of evidence shows that institutions can 
propagate non-fundamental volatility due to demand shocks caused by flows from their investors (Coval 
and Stafford 2007; Lou 2012). Recently, several papers study the effect of ETF on price efficiency and find 
an inverse relation between ETF ownership and price efficiency (Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi 
2018; Israeli, Lee, and Sridharan 2017). We document the opposite relation between common ownership 
and price efficiency based on a quasi-natural experiment setting. These results  suggest that investors who 
have significant ownership in multiple companies appear to invest more resources to analyze the companies 
in their portfolio, while investors who own companies through an ETF appear to be liquidity-motivated 
investors. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on investment sensitivity to share prices. The literature shows 
that when price movement is noisy, investment sensitivity to stock prices weakens. Antoniou, 
Subrahmanyam, and Tosun (2018), for example, show that managers of firms with high ETF ownership 
rely less on stock prices due to noisy prices. Further, Lou and Wang (2018) study liquidity driven mutual 
fund trading as a source of noisy prices. Our findings support the notion that managers of commonly held 
firms are more sensitive to their share prices because of the higher level of price efficiency. 
Finally, at a practical level, our research intends to contribute to the ongoing debate among 
regulatory bodies on the consequences of common ownership. Common ownership has recently been under 
scrutiny from regulators in the U.S. including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). By studying the capital market 
consequences of common ownership, we contribute to this debate and help develop a more comprehensive 





2. Hypotheses development 
We hypothesize that common owners’ information-based activities contribute to price informativeness by 
improving the level and quality of information production. Our hypothesis rests on the notion that common 
owners face greater incentives to obtain and interpret new information as the information they collect on 
their investments can complement common owners’ analyses of peer firms by placing them in a broader 
context (Shroff, Verdi and Yost 2017). Common owners, consequently, can spread their information search 
and processing costs over a larger set of companies and attain lower information costs. Consistently, we 
predict that the efficiency gains that investors achieve by holding multiple stocks increases their willingness 
to obtain new information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) or information of higher precision (Verrechia 
1982). 
Common owners are in a strong position to help speed up information diffusion by serving as a 
conduit for information to flow across companies. Shareholders with large investments exert significant 
effort to influence corporate policy on a wide range of issues including governance decisions, disclosure 
policies, and product market strategies (Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2016; Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu 2018; 
Boone and White 2015; Dimson, Karakas, and Li 2015). Survey results, as well as anecdotal evidence, 
indicate that asset managers frequently attend private meetings with board members and corporate 
executives where they communicate their concerns with the goal of influencing corporate decision-making 
(McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 2016). Common owners’ engagement with high level corporate officers 
and board members places them in a unique position to benefit from a continuous inflow of information 
about the company of interest as well as its competitors. 
Further, common owners can directly contribute to price efficiency by trading on their private 
information when they observe that share prices differ from their intrinsic values (Edmans 2009). In 
addition, common owners’ informational advantage may discourage uninformed trading activity and help 
share prices reflect more of informed traders’ private information. We, therefore, predict that common 
ownership reduces non-fundamental volatility by facilitating informed trading. 
9 
 
Conversely, prior research on index investing emphasizes the passive nature of this investment 
style and conjectures that such a strategy weakens information production and dampens market efficiency 
(Kacperczyk, Nosal and Sundaresan 2018; Breugem and Buss 2019; Bond and Garcia 2019) and reduces 
the extent to which share prices reflect fundamental information (Israeli, Lee, and Sridharan 2017; Glosten, 
Nallareddy, and Zou 2019). If common owners become less engaged in information search and acquisition 
activities and thereby adopt a passive investment style, we should observe no relation or an inverse relation 
between shocks to common ownership and price efficiency. 
Hypothesis 1A: Common ownership enhances price efficiency. 
Hypothesis 1B: Common ownership weakens price efficiency. 
To the extent that common owners affect price informativeness, their ownership may have real 
consequences on corporate policy. There is agreement among scholars that share prices can contain 
information that corporate managers lack (e.g., Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang 2007; Dow, Goldstein, and 
Guembel 2006; Dye and Sridhar 2002). The notion of share prices conveying information beyond what 
managers know about the company yields the possibility of managers learning from prices, which assigns 
a greater role to financial markets. According to this view, managers make corporate decisions (e.g., 
investment) based on the information available to them as well as the incremental information conveyed 
through share prices. Investors, therefore, influence corporate managers’ decision by affecting share prices 
through their informed trading activities. Consistent with this notion, Edmans (2009) demonstrates that, 
due to the guiding feature of prices, investors with large ownership stakes can influence corporate behavior 
without directly intervening in management. 
Indeed, the extant literature shows that changes in price informativeness caused by new rules or 
institutional investing have real effects on corporate investment. Edmans, Jayaraman and Schneemeier 
(2017) use the enactment of insider trading laws passed around the world as an exogenous shock to the 
incremental information in share prices, and find that investment-to-Q sensitivity increases after the 
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enactment of new insider trading rules. Conversely, Antoniou, Subrahmanyam, and Tosun (2018) find that 
firms with high ETF ownership experience a decrease in the investment-to-Q sensitivity, due to the noisy 
nature of ETF trading.  
In summary, managers’ use of information in share prices to make investment decisions is likely 
to vary in relation to price informativeness (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang 2007; Edmans, Jayaraman, and 
Schneemeier 2017). To the extent that common ownership increases overall price efficiency and/or the 
amount of information in prices that managers lack, managers are likely to alter the weight that they place 
on share prices as they make investment decisions. We, therefore, hypothesize that the investment-to-Q 
sensitivity is related to the extent common ownership affects the informativeness of share prices. If common 
ownership increases (resp., decreases) price efficiency, then we predict a positive (resp., inverse) relation 
between common ownership and investment-to-Q sensitivity.  
Hypothesis 2A: Investment-to-Q sensitivity increases with the level of common ownership. 
Hypothesis 2B: Investment-to-Q sensitivity decreases with the level of common ownership. 
 
3. Main Variables and Methodology 
We compile security data (e.g., return, price, shares) from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
financial statement data from Compustat, institutional ownership and financial institution merger data from 
Thompson Reuters. Our sample consists of firms that were subject to financial institution mergers from 
1983 to 2011. Since the variables in our analyses are measured over the period of t + 1 to t + 3, our final 
sample spans the period of 1980-2014. We provide descriptions of our main variables and their summary 




3.1 Common Ownership Variables 
Common ownership measures the level of interconnectedness of a firm with other firms in the same industry 
through institutional block-holders. An institution is defined as a cross-holding institution if the institution 
block-holds at least five percent of the outstanding shares in a given firm and simultaneously block-holds 
at least one or more of the same industry peers. We use the four-digit SIC industry classification to define 
industries.  
We follow He and Huang (2017) and measure common ownership using five different variables: 
CrossDummy, NConnected, NCross, AvgNum, and TotalCrossOwn. CrossDummy is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one if a firm is block-held by a cross-holding institution during any of the four quarters 
of a fiscal year and zero otherwise. NConnected equals the number of same industry peers that are connected 
with the firm through shared cross-holding institutions. NCross equals the number of unique institutions 
that cross-hold the firm. AvgNum is the average number of same-industry peers block-held by institutions 
that block-hold the firm. TotalCrossOwn is the sum of all percentage holdings of institutions that cross-
hold the firm. With the exception of the CrossDummy variable, we first calculate common ownership 
variables in a given quarter, then average across the four quarters in a fiscal year.  
 
3.2 Price Efficiency and Corporate Investment Variables 
This section describes the key variables that measure price efficiency and corporate investment. In addition 
to the key variables described below, our empirical analyses use various firm characteristics that might 
affect stock returns, volatility, as well as firms’ investment decisions. Appendix A provides detailed 
definitions of all variables that we use in our analyses. 
Our main empirical tests of price efficiency analyze price informativeness in relation to future 
earnings. Lundholm and Myers (2002) estimate the relation between earnings and returns to measure the 
degree to which the future earnings news is incorporated into current stock prices. To test whether share 
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prices of commonly-held companies reflect future earnings information more efficiently, we apply their 
method to our difference-in-difference setting where we regress annual returns on current and future 
earnings.  
We measure annual returns (RETi,t) as the buy-and-hold return for firm i during the 12-month period 
ending three months after the end-date of fiscal year t. Current earnings, Xi,t, represents income available to 
common shareholders of firm i before extraordinary items during fiscal year t, deflated by market value of 
equity three months after the end of fiscal year t – 1. Future earnings, X2i,t, equals the sum of income 
available to common shareholders of firm i before extraordinary items for the two year period following 
year t, deflated by market value of equity three months after the end of fiscal year t – 1. We also calculate 
future returns, R2i,t, as firm i’s buy-and-hold return for the two-year period following year t, starting three 
months after the current fiscal year-end date. 
Our alternative measure of price efficiency is the variance ratio, estimated following Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988), O’Hara and Ye (2011), and Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2018). The variance 
ratio is defined as the absolute value of the variance of five-day returns (𝑟5,𝑖𝑡) in a given quarter divided by 
five times the variance of one-day returns (𝑟1,𝑖𝑡) in the same quarter minus one (Eq. 2).  
 





To the extent that autocorrelations in security returns are stronger, the variance ratio will deviate from zero. 
The variance ratio, therefore, is lower for firms with more efficient stock prices. 
Finally, we study the relation between corporate investment and Tobin’s Q to test whether 
managers’ investment behavior is affected by common ownership. To study the investment-Q relation, we 
use four different proxies to measure the level of corporate investment: CAPXRND, Investment, RND, and 
DisExp. CAPXRND represents capital expenditures plus research and development expenses scaled by 
lagged total assets. Investment is the sum of research and development expenses, capital expenditures and 
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acquisition costs minus receipts from sale of PPE scaled by lagged total assets. RND equals research and 
development expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. DisExp is the sum of research and development 
expenditures and advertising expenses scaled by lagged total assets. Finally, Qit is the market value of equity 
plus the book value of total assets minus book value of equity, scaled by book value of total assets.  
 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the correlation matrix (Panel B) for the variables 
employed in our analysis. The statistics in Panel A reveal that common ownership is highly pervasive in 
our sample. For instance, 77.7 percent of the firm-years in our sample are held by a cross-holding institution, 
and on average, firms in our sample are connected to 5.3 peer firms through cross-holding institutions. In 
addition, cross-holding institutions hold 10.9 percent of total shares outstanding of the sample firms. 
Finally, the average annual raw return (RET) for firm-years in our sample equals 17.5 percent, while the 
log of the book-to-market ratio (BTM) equals -0.70, and 69.4 percent of the shares of the sample firms are 
held by institutional investors. 
Panel B reports Pearson correlations in the upper right corner, and Spearman correlations in the 
lower left corner. As expected, the five common ownership variables are highly correlated, although the 
correlations are sufficiently low, which indicates that those variables capture distinct aspects of common 
ownership. In addition, common ownership variables exhibit significant positive correlations with size and 
institutional ownership, suggesting that larger firms that have higher institutional ownership are more likely 




4. Main Empirical Analysis: Common Ownership and Price Efficiency 
This section provides the results of our main empirical analyses, and establishes the link between common 
ownership and price efficiency. We utilize a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, exploiting financial 
institution mergers as a source of exogenous shock to common ownership.  
 
4.1 Financial Institution Mergers 
The endogenous nature of the relation between common ownership and price efficiency makes it 
challenging to investigate the causal effect of common ownership on price efficiency. Specifically, firms 
with efficient prices may attract more cross-holding institutions potentially due to less information 
acquisition costs. Further, omitted variables can affect both the cross-holding decision of an institution and 
the price efficiency of a firm, biasing cross-sectional coefficient estimates. To the extent that such forces 
are at work, the inference that common ownership leads to higher price efficiency based on pooled analyses 
may be biased. To address these potential concerns, we follow prior work in the literature (e.g., Azar, 
Schmalz, and Tecu 2018; He and Huang 2017; Lewellen and Lowry 2018) and use financial institution 
mergers as a plausibly exogenous shock to common ownership. 
The extant literature uses financial institution mergers as a quasi-natural experiment based on the 
premise that these institutions often merge for reasons other than the fundamentals of their portfolio firms. 
Since the acquirer usually maintains the existing portfolio holdings of the target institution due to liquidity 
and transaction costs concerns (e.g., Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers 1990), mergers generate meaningful 
exogenous variations in firms’ common ownership. Specifically, if a firm is block-held by one of the 
merging institutions before the merger, and at the same time the other party of the merger block-holds one 
of the industry peers, then the firm is more likely to be cross-held by the merged institution after the merger, 
thereby increasing the extent of common ownership in the firm. 
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We use institution mergers that took place between the years 1983 and 2011.7 Following He and 
Huang (2017), we identify treatment firms as those that are block-held by one of the merging institutions 
during the quarter before the merger announcement date, and the other party of the merger holds at least 
one same-industry peer but not the firm itself, during the same quarter before the merger. Treatment firms 
are likely to experience an increase in common ownership after the merger because they are more likely to 
establish new linkages with the same industry peers through the merger. Control firms, on the other hand, 
are those that are block-held by one of the merging institutions (this holds for the treatment), but the other 
merging institution does not block-hold same-industry peers. The control firms, therefore, are unlikely to 
experience an increase in common ownership due to the merger. 
It is important to note that we identify treatment and control firms based on ex-ante holdings 
information rather than actual post-merger holdings, because relying on the latter might introduce selection 
bias. Since control firms are also block-held by the same merging institutions, any firm characteristics that 
may be related to investment styles or management skills of the merging institutions can also be controlled 
for. In addition, since the merging institutions block-hold both treatment and control firms, the treatment 
effect is unlikely to be due to block-holding. Our final difference-in-difference (DiD) sample consists of 
2,989 unique firms including 217 treated firms. 
 
4.2 Effect of Financial Institution Mergers on Common Ownership 
In order to validate our use of financial institution mergers as an exogenous shock to common ownership, 
we examine whether mergers are associated with future changes in the level of common ownership for 
treatment and control firms. Panels A and B of Table 2 provide summary statistics of the common 
ownership variables during the pre- and post-institution merger periods, respectively. Panel A demonstrates 
                                                             
7 The list of mergers can be found in Table A1 of He and Huang (2017). From the list, we exclude the mergers for 
which no treatment firm is identified. 
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that there are no significant differences in common ownership variables, except for NConnected and 
AvgNum, between treatment and control groups before the merger. In Panel B, however, we find that all 
five proxies of common ownership significantly increase for treatment firms in post-merger period.  
Panel C reports the DiD tests using the common ownership variables as the dependent variables. 
Treat is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is identified as a treatment firm and zero if it is 
considered a control firm. Post is an indicator variable that equals one for the post-merger period and zero 
for the pre-merger period. The pre- and post-merger periods are t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3, respectively, where 
year t is the announcement year of the merger. These results confirm that firms in the treatment group 
undergo a significant increase in common ownership during the post-merger period. For example, during 
the post-merger period, treatment firms experience a 5.8% (= 0.012 + 0.046) increase in likelihood of being 
commonly owned by the merging institutions. Given that 74% of treatment firms were commonly held 
prior to mergers, the increase is economically significant. We find similar results across all proxies of 
common ownership. 
 
4.3 Price Informativeness 
The results in Table 2 provide an empirical basis to use financial institution mergers as exogenous shocks 
to common ownership. Having established the effect of mergers on common ownership, we next examine 
whether the extent to which future earnings information are reflected in share price changes for treatment 
firms after the merger. 
 Lundholm and Myers (2002) study the relation between earnings and returns to measure how well 
share prices reflect current and future earnings. A firm’s return over a year should reflect a portion of 
unexpected current earnings realization and a portion that is due to expected changes about future earnings. 
Our first hypothesis that common ownership leads to an increase in price informativeness implies that 
current year’s returns reflect more of future earnings information for treatment firms after the merger.  
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We estimate the following generalized difference-in-difference (DiD) regression8: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖.,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑋𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜸′𝒁𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(2) 
Descriptions of the dependent variable, RET, and main independent variables, X and X2, are provided in 
Section 3.2. Z constitutes a vector of control variables and various fixed effects. We include past earnings 
(lagged X), and future returns (𝑅2𝑖,𝑡), and interactions of these variables with Treat and Post dummies, to 
account for possible under or over-reaction to past and current earnings. To control for firm size, we include 
the inverse of market value of equity (invME). We also control for book-to-market (BTM), negative earnings 
(LOSS) and institutional ownership (IO).9 
Hypothesis 1A predicts that common ownership is positively associated with the level of price 
informativeness because common owners’ information activities help information in future earnings 
become quickly reflected in current share prices. We, therefore, predict that the coefficient on our main 
variable of interest, X2 × Post × Treat will be positive. To the extent that future earnings news is impounded 
into prices, current earnings are likely to become less value-relevant. If, for example, investors fully 
anticipate future earnings, then they would choose to rely less on current earnings to make trading decisions. 
Consistent with this argument, we predict that the coefficient on X2 × Post × Treat will be negative. 
Table 3 reports the results of our analysis. We include firm and year fixed effects to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms and years. A firm may serve as a treatment firm in one merger and/or 
a control firm in another merger. Therefore, we also use merger fixed effects to mitigate concerns related 
to unobserved merger-specific heterogeneity in treatment/control firms, as well as institution-specific 
                                                             
8 To estimate Equation (4), we use a sample period that spans from t-4 to t-2 and t+1 to t+3 as the pre- and post-merger 
periods to avoid any overlap in the construction of the explanatory variables, X2 and R2. For other DiD tests, we use 
t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3 as the pre- and post-merger periods.   
9 IO represents an orthogonalized institutional ownership measure. First, we obtain residuals from a regression of total 
institutional ownership on CrossDummy and TotalCrossOwn. Then, we rank the residuals into decile and scale the 
decile scores at zero to one to obtain IO.  
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investment styles or management skills. We base our discussion on the most stringent fixed effects 
structure, which consists of Firm × Merger and Year × Merger interaction variables, presented in columns 
(9) and (10). Our results, however, are similar when we rely on different fixed effect structures that are 
presented in columns (1) – (8). 
In Column (10), the coefficient on future earnings, X2, is estimated to be 0.753 (p < 0.01), 
suggesting that current returns are positively associated with future earnings during the pre-merger period. 
The coefficient on X2 × Post is not statistically significant, suggesting that, as expected, mergers appear to 
have no impact on the extent to which share prices of control firms reflect future earnings. Importantly, the 
coefficient estimate for the interaction term, X2 × Post × Treat, equals 1.977 (p < 0.05), which indicates 
that firms that undergo a shock to common ownership experience a significant increase in the degree to 
which their share prices reflect future earnings information. The coefficient is economically significant, 
implying that a one percent increase in future earnings leads to return that are approximately two percentage 
points greater for treatment firms compared to control firms during the post-merger period.10 
We additionally find that share prices react to contemporaneous earnings to a lesser degree for 
treatment firms, relative to control firms during the post-merger period. Specifically, in Column (10), the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction variable, X × Post × Treat, equals -3.219 (p < 0.05). These results, 
together with the positive coefficient on X2 × Post × Treat, indicate that share prices become more forward 
looking and current earnings news becomes less relevant when common ownership increases.11 Overall, 
our inferences from the DiD analyses provide evidence in support of a causal link between common 
ownership and price informativeness with respect to future earnings. 
                                                             
10 Under the assumption of perfect foresight and the price-to-earnings ratio of 10, a 1% increase in future earnings will 
lead to a 10% increase in current return. Therefore, the coefficient of two implies 20% of the future earnings 
information is reflected in the current prices.  
11 Lundholm and Myers (2002) find that more disclosure activity ‘brings the future forward’, therefore stock returns 
depend more on future earnings news and less on current earnings.   
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4.4 Variance Ratios 
In this section, we use variance ratios, defined in Eq. (1), as an alternative measure of price efficiency. 
Variance ratios measure the transitory component of stock prices. If stock prices are affected by liquidity 
trading, the price movements are more likely to be temporary, inducing a negative autocorrelation. 
Similarly, under-reaction of stock prices to news, due to the obscure information environment, would result 
in a positive autocorrelation. However, if stock price movements are due to fundamental information, the 
price movements will follow a random walk. The variance ratio, therefore, is lower for firms with more 
efficient stock prices. 
According to Hypothesis 1A, share prices of companies with greater common ownership are more 
efficient than firms with less common ownership. To test the effect of common ownership on variance 
ratios, we estimate following regression model: 
 𝑉𝑅𝑖,𝑞 =  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡+ 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜸′𝑍𝑖,𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖.𝑞 ,  (3) 
where VRi,q is the variance ratio for firm i in quarter q, and Z is a vector of control variables. The sample 
period is t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3, where t is the merger announcement year. Based on the hypothesis that 
common ownership enhances price efficiency, we expect 𝛽3  to be negative. The estimation results of 
Equation (3), reported in Table 4, are consistent with this prediction.  
All specifications in Table 4 reveal a statistically significant decline in variance ratios for treatment 
firms’ during the post-merger period. In Column (10), for example, we find that the coefficient on Treat × 
Post is estimated to be -0.017 (p < 0.05). This coefficient is economically meaningful, implying a 5.4 
percent decrease compared to the average variance ratio (7.3 percent of the standard deviation). These 
findings suggest that stock prices of commonly held firms are more efficient and less likely to be affected 




5. Channels: How Does Common Ownership Increase Price Efficiency? 
A natural follow-up question to our findings thus-far is “how does common ownership increase price 
efficiency?” In this section, we identify channels through which common ownership increases firms’ price 
informativeness. First, we examine whether cross-holding institutions enhance the information flow 
between peer companies by exploiting cross-sectional variations in the geographical and social distance 
between connected firms. We, then, investigate whether there is a significant increase in informed trading 
activities for firms with higher common ownership. Finally, we examine whether the increase in price 
informativeness is related to the actual trading activities of cross-holding institutions. 
 
5.1 Geographical Distance and Social Connectedness 
Do common owners contribute to the flow of information between connected firms? Common owners are 
institutional investors who hold sizeable stakes in multiple companies in the same industry. Therefore, once 
two companies become connected through a common owner, information diffusion between commonly-
held firms is additionally facilitated by the common owner, which is likely to produce efficiency gains. In 
addition, this improvement in efficiency would be more pronounced among firms for which information 
diffusion was previously difficult due to frictions. We, therefore, conjecture that the efficiency gain due to 
common ownership is stronger for firms that have higher information frictions. Testing this conjecture 
requires a measure of friction. 
We estimate the frictions in information diffusion using the geographical distance and level of 
social connectedness between firms that are commonly owned. Prior evidence indicates that information 
spreads between geographically close investors and that geographically proximate investors have an 
informational advantage over remote investors (Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001; Hong Kubik and Stein 
2005; Malloy 2005). In addition to geographical distance, social networks help overcome informational and 
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cultural frictions in investment and trades (Hong, Kubik and Stein 2004); Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel 
and Wong 2018). 
When a firm and its peers are geographically distant, information transfer among these firms is 
costlier (Jennings et al. 2017). For example, let us assume that Firm A and Firm B are in the same industry, 
but geographically remote (or have weak social connectedness). An investor, who has an information 
advantage for Firm A due to geographical proximity, produces private information regarding Firm A that 
is pertinent for Firm B. However, she is unfamiliar with Firm B, and lacks incentive to use the information 
to trade shares of Firm B. Now assume a cross-holding institution that block-holds both firms. Since the 
cross-holding institution has sizeable stakes in both firms, it has stronger incentive to use the information 
obtained about Firm A to trade shares of Firm B. The cross-holding institution, therefore, helps information 
flow between the two firms, and such information can now be impounded into the stock price of Firm B. 
Based on the intuition above, we expect to find a stronger efficiency gain in treatment firms where 
geographical distance (social connection) is larger (weaker) before the merger. 
The analysis in Table 5 tests this conjecture. We re-define the treatment group from the subsample 
of firms in the original treatment group that are above (below) median of the geographical distance (or 
social connectedness) during the year immediately before the merger announcement year. The geographical 
distance (social connectedness) is the distance (proportion of friendship links) between treatment firms that 
are connected through an institution merger. Geographical distance is measured based on the ZIP codes of 
headquarters of connected firms.12 We measure social connectedness using the Social Connectedness Index 
(SCI) developed by Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, Stroebel and Wong (2018). SCI uses Facebook data to measure 
the frequency of friendship links between users located in different U.S. counties. The index values are 
normalized to facilitate comparison across county-pairs and provide a measure of the relative differences 
in the total number of friendship links. 
                                                             
12 We obtain ZIP code data from the SEC filings to ensure that we identify the historical location of the companies in 
our sample. When the ZIP code is unavailable through this approach, however, we use Compustat ZIP code data. 
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Table 5 Panels A and B use geographical distance as a proxy for information friction. Panel A 
reports the results of regressions of returns on future earnings (Eq 2) and Panel B presents the estimation 
results of the variance ratio regression model (Eq 3). For Columns (1) through (4), Treat is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a firm is identified as a treatment with below median geographical distant peers 
and zero otherwise, while for Columns (5) through (8), Treat is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
firm is identified as a treatment with above median geographical distant peers and zero otherwise.  
The estimation results show that future earnings information is impounded into current returns more 
efficiently for firms with distant peers (Panel A) and that the reduction in variance ratios is greater for 
treatment firms for which peer firms are geographically distant from each other (Panel B). These results, 
collectively, show that our key inferences are driven by treatment firms with geographically remote peers. 
In Panels C and D, we repeat our analyses using the SCI as our proxy for friction in information 
flow. Similar to Panels A and B, we divide the treatment firms based on the median value of social 
connectedness with their peers. Our analysis based on the social connection measure produces results that 
are similar to those based on geographical distance. We find that current returns become more informative 
with respect to future earnings information for treatment firms with weaker social connectedness. Similarly, 
variance ratios decline more for treatment firms with less socially connected peers. A comparison of the 
magnitudes of coefficients reported in Table 5 with those in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that results are 
primarily driven by the treatment sample with distant peers and less socially connected peers. Our findings 
suggest that common ownership enhances information flow between firms for which information flow was 
previously more difficult due to higher information frictions. 
 
5.2 Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) and Bid-Ask Spread 
In this section, we examine the information environment of treatment firms after financial institution 
mergers. Block-holders have strong incentives to gather information concerning the fundamental value of 
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a firm and trade based on that information, inducing prices to reflect more of the fundamental value 
(Edmans 2009). Moreover, Bushee and Goodman (2007) and Maffett (2012) argue that large institutional 
investors can execute profitable trades based on their private information. A cross block-holding institution, 
being a block-holder of one firm and a same-industry peer at the same time, can generate informational 
advantages over other investors. We, therefore, hypothesize that common owners develop competitive 
advantages in acquiring and processing information by having access to and spreading their aggregate 
information costs across a larger number of firms in the same industry. Given these advantages, the presence 
of common owners in a firm may induce more informed trading for the firm.  
Panel A of Table 6 examines whether common ownership increases the likelihood of informed 
trading. We regress the probability of informed trading (PIN) on Treat and Post indicators along with other 
control variables and fixed effects. PIN is calculated following Chen, Goldstein and Jiang’s (2007) 
approach. Treat and Post represent indicator variables as defined in Section 4. The sample period is t-3 to 
t-1 year and t+1 to t+3, where t is the merger announcement year. 
We find that the probability of informed trading significantly increases for the treatment firms after 
the merger relative to control firms. In Column (8) we find that treatment firm’s PIN increases by 0.015 (p 
< 0.05) more than the control group during the post-merger period. This implies treatment firms experience 
a 8.6% increase compared to its mean (a 15.8% increase compared to its standard deviation) during the 
post-merger period. These results are robust throughout various specifications. 
In Panel B, we use bid-ask spreads as the dependent variable. The extant literature shows that 
informed trading is associated with lower bid-ask spread (e.g., Colllin-Dufresne and Fos 2015 and Admati 
and Pfleiderer 1988). In particular, Kacperczyk and Pagnotta (2019) argue that if market markers learn from 
informed traders fast enough, then the bid-ask spread is lower on average with the presence of informed 
trading. Moreover, Park et al. (2019) find that common ownership encourages firms to disclose more 
information voluntarily, potentially reducing information asymmetry. Based on these arguments, we 
hypothesize that common ownership reduces information asymmetry (adverse selection).  
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Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the bid-ask spread decreases for treatment firms 
compared to control firms in the post-merger period. For example, Model (9) shows that, on average, the 
bid-ask spread of treatment firms is smaller by -0.010 (p<0.05) compared to control firms’ post-merger 
period. Overall, our results in Table 6 imply that common ownership induces more informed trading and 
reduces information asymmetry.  
 
5.3 Holdings Changes and Stock Returns 
In an effort to shed more light on how common owners’ information is impounded into stock prices, we 
further examine whether trading activities of common owners are related to price efficiency. If, as we 
predict, cross-holding institutions produce more information, then their trades should be more strongly 
correlated with contemporaneous returns. To empirically test this conjecture, we investigate the 
contemporaneous relation between stock returns and the trading activities of the merging institutions.  
We examine whether merging institutions’ trading activities are more informative for treatment 
firms during the post-merger period compared to control firms. Specifically, we estimate the following 
empirical model: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝛥𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽4𝛥𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 
+𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛤′𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(4) 
 
where the holding change (ΔH) of a merging institution for firm i is defined as Hi,t – Hi,t-1 and Hi,t equals 
the percentage holding by the institution in year t of firm i. In Equation (4), the main parameter of interest 
is the coefficient on ∆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. A positive coefficient on this interaction variable would imply 
that merged institutions’ trading activities are more informative for treatment firms relative to control firms 
after mergers.  
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Table 7 reports the estimation results of Equation (4). The coefficients on holdings changes (ΔH) 
are estimated to be statistically indistinguishable from zero in all models. These results imply that trades of 
merged institution are unrelated to the returns of the sample firms during the pre-merger period. In contrast, 
the coefficients on the interaction variable, ∆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, are positive and statistically significant 
in all specifications, implying that trading activities of merged institutions are more positively correlated 
with returns of treatment firms relative to control firms during the post-merger period. These results suggest 
that the trades of institutions that become common owners as a result of mergers begin to convey more 
information after mergers. As a result, stock prices of treatment firms become more informative. Our 
findings, in this section, point towards trading activities as a mechanism through which common ownership 
enhances price efficiency.13 
 
5.4 Active Trading and Price Informativeness 
In this section we directly examine the relation between price informativeness and the trading activity of 
merging institutions. If trading by cross-holding institutions help share prices become more informative, 
we should observe the increase in price efficiency to be more prominent among treatment firms for which 
there is more active trading. 
To test this relation, we divide the sample of treatment firms into two groups; firms with higher 
level of active trading by merging institutions, and firms with lower level of active trading. Specifically, 
we introduce an indicator variable, “Above” (“Below”), that equals one if the absolute value of holdings 
changes (|ΔH|) by the merging institution during year (quarter) t is above (below) the median value, zero 
                                                             
13 We acknowledge that post-merger holding changes of merging institutions may be related to some unobservable 
that is specific to the mergers, such as liquidity needs or institutions’ portfolio objectives. Therefore, one may argue 
that using the information about merging institutions’ holdings may raise an endogeneity concern. However, we think 
our results are unlikely to suffer from this endogeneity concern for the following reasons. First, the treatment firms 
are determined based on pre-merger information, rather than post-merger holdings information. Second, post-merger 
holding changes that are motivated by non-fundamental reasons, such as portfolio rebalancing due to fund policies, 
mostly occur in year t, which is omitted from our analysis. Finally, if trading activities for treatment firms are not 
motivated by fundamental information, β4 is likely to be biased down, which would go against finding the results.  
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otherwise.14 We, then, interact the variable Above (Below) with Treat to analyze whether the effect of 
common ownership is stronger in the subsample of treatment firms that are above (below) the median of 
|ΔH|. 
Table 8 Panel A reports the DiD regression results of stock returns on future earnings. We find that 
stock prices of treatment firms with active trading institutions incorporate future earnings information more 
efficiently. The coefficients on X2×Treat×Post×Above are positive and statistically significant in all 
specifications. Conversely, for treatment firms with below median trading activities, the coefficient on the 
interaction variable is not statistically significant, implying that the efficiency gains come, primarily, from 
treatment firms for which institutions actively trade. 
Panel B reports regression results for variance ratios. Both treatment groups with above and below 
median level of active trading activities display a significant decrease in variance ratio. However, the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates are higher for the “Above” treatment group. Model (8), for example, 
shows that the coefficient for the “Above” group is -0.032 and statistically significant at the one-percent 
significance level, while the coefficient of “Below” is two thirds of the “Above” group in absolute terms at 
a ten-percent significance level. The differential in magnitudes between the two interaction variables is also 
evident in other model specifications, although to a smaller degree. 
Overall, our analyses show that common owners’ active trading enhances the efficiency of 
treatment firms’ share prices. We conclude that cross-holding institutions help facilitate information flow 
between connected peers through their trading activities, which leads to more informative stock prices.  
  
                                                             
14 Note that by using the absolute value of holdings change, we focus on the level of trading activities rather than the 
direction of those activities.  
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6. Investment-to-Q Sensitivity 
To the extent that common ownership has a positive effect on the price efficiency of a firm’s share prices, 
managers are more likely to rely on stock prices as they make managerial decisions. In this section, we 
examine whether the effect of common ownership on price informativeness has real consequences on one 
of the most important corporate policy decisions that managers make: investments. Specifically, we 
examine whether the investment-to-Q sensitivity changes due to institutional common ownership. 
As we did with prior analyses, we use a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution 
mergers to produce evidence relevant to our understanding of the causal relation between common 
ownership and investment-to-Q sensitivity. Specifically, we estimate the DiD regression presented below:  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝛾′𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(5) 
 
Table 9 reports the results of regressing the four investment measures on Tobin’s Q, Treat, Post 
and the interactions among these variables along with control variables. We use CAPXRND, Investment, 
R&D, and DisExp as measures of corporate investment. The sample periods are t-3 to t-1 (pre-merger 
period) and t+1 to t+3 (post-merger period), where year t is the merger announcement year. 
Our primary variable of interest in Table 9 is the triple interaction term, Treat × Post × Q. The 
coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant for all four investment proxies. The 
positive and statistically significant coefficients indicate that treatment firms experience an increase in their 
investment-to-Q sensitivity following shocks to common ownership, relative to control firms. For instance, 
when we include Firm×Merger and Year×Merger fixed effects, investment-to-Q sensitivity increases for 
treatment firms by 3.545 (p < 0.1), 5.917 (p < 0.1), 3.598 (p < 0.05), and 3.855 (p < 0.05) for each of the 
investment measures. Overall, our results support the conclusion that managers of commonly held 
companies rely to a greater extent on stock prices when making investment decisions. Combining our 
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results in the previous sections, we argue that as firms’ share prices become more efficient due to common 
ownership, managers rely more on stock prices, leading to a greater investment-to-Q sensitivity. 
 
7. Robustness Checks and Falsification Tests 
In this section, we conduct a series of robustness tests. First, we construct an alternative control sample to 
mitigate concerns of control firms in the main analyses being in different industries from the treatment 
firms. Therefore, following Lewellen and Lowry (2019), we construct an alternative control sample based 
on size and industry. For each treatment firm, we first select firms in the same four-digit SIC industry but 
not block-held by the merging institutions. We then match the five firms closest in size to each treatment 
firm. Since firms that are in different industries might face different information environments, our 
robustness check ensures that the informational efficiency gain due to common ownership is not driven by 
differences in industry or size between treatment and control firms. We re-estimate our DiD analyses using 
this alternative control sample and report our results in Table 10.  
Panel A of Table 10 presents the estimation results of regressing annual returns on current and 
future earnings, as we did previously (Table 3), using the alternative control sample. We find that treatment 
firms experience an increase in price informativeness. Specifically, their share prices begin to reflect future 
earnings more efficiently after an increase in common ownership. In Panel B, we conduct the variance ratio 
test using the alternative control sample. We find that treatment firms experience a significant decrease in 
their variance ratio after mergers, which is consistent with our main analysis in Table 4. In Panel C, we also 
examine whether our findings regarding the investment-to-Q sensitivity analyses are robust to different 
control sample choices. We find robust evidence suggesting that increases in common ownership leads to 




We, next, perform a placebo (falsification) test by using the t-4 period as the “pseudo-event” year. 
The main objective of the falsification test is to provide assurance that the parallel trend assumption is not 
violated in our DiD setting. We define t-4 as the “psuedo-event” year and re-define the POST dummy such 
that it equals one for years t-3 through t-1 and zero for years t-7 through t-5. Re-defining the time periods 
allows us to check whether there are any pre-trends and/or differences between treatment and control firms 
during the seven years prior to the actual event year. We use the same set of control and treatment firms as 
in Tables 3, 4, and 9. These results are reported in Table 11. 
We find no significant relation between future earnings and stock returns for treatment firms after 
we re-define the POST variable. The triple interaction term, X2 × Post × Treat, is not statistically significant 
in any of the models. These results show that the extent to which information in future earnings is 
incorporated into stock prices does not differ between treatment and control firms after the “pseudo-event” 
year. In Panel B, we report results for variance ratios. We find that the coefficient for Treat × Post is also 
not statistically significant in any of the specifications. In Panel C, we examine the investment-to-Q 
sensitivity and find no significant difference between treatment and control firms during the re-defined post 
period. Overall, our evidence in Table 11 supports the conclusion that there are no significant differences 
between treatment and control firms in price informativeness and investment-to-Q sensitivity in years prior 
to the actual event year. 
Lewellen and Lowry (2019) argue that the effects researchers attribute to common ownership in 
the current literature are driven by differential responses by firms to the financial crisis. To address this 
concern, we exclude the financial crisis period and re-estimate our analyses. Specifically, we estimate the 
main difference-in-difference test, excluding the institutional mergers for which effective dates are in the 
period of the financial crisis. We define the financial crisis period as the period of 07/2007 to 12/2009. 
Table 12 reports these estimation results. In Panel A, our results suggest that returns of treatment firms 
reflect more of future earnings information during the post-merger period. Panel B reports a significant and 
negative coefficients on Post × Treat, indicating that our results on the variance ratio are not sensitive to 
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the exclusion of the financial crisis period. Lastly, the results of the investment-to-Q sensitivity analysis are 
unaffected by excluding mergers that took place during the financial crisis period. Overall, our results are 
not driven by a differential rate of recovery from the financial crisis. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effect of common ownership on share price efficiency and corporate investment. 
Using financial institution mergers as a source of identification, we find that positive shocks to common 
ownership lead to a stronger relation between current stock returns and future earnings news. Hence, stock 
prices of commonly held firms appear to reflect a greater amount of future earnings news. We also show 
that common ownership is associated with a reduction in variance ratios, suggesting that share prices of 
commonly held firms are less influenced by noise traders or short-term liquidity shock. These findings 
suggest that common ownership has a positive effect on price informativeness. 
We investigate the potential mechanisms through which common ownership can affect price 
efficiency. Among treatment firms, geographically and socially distant peers experience greater post-
merger efficiency gain. The probability of informed trading increases for treatment firms, and trading 
activities of merging institutions are more informative for treatment firms. In addition, the post-merger 
efficiency gain is greater for treatment firms for which merging institutions actively trade. These results 
suggest that common owners contribute to price efficiency by facilitating information diffusion and 
informed trading. 
Finally, we ask whether managers of commonly held companies rely more on share prices in 
making investment decisions. We document a positive link between common ownership and investment-
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Figure 1. Trends in Common Ownership 
This figure plots the trends in common ownership and total institutional ownership from 1980 to 2013. The 
blue line with circles plots the average institutional ownership (Average IO), while the red line with squares 
shows the average percentage holding by common owners (Average TotalCrossOwn). For each year, we 
obtain annual institutional ownership in a firm by taking average of quarterly institutional ownership of the 
firm. Then, Average IO for the year is calculated from the average institutional ownership across all the 
firms in the sample. TotalCrossOwn is the sum of percentage holdings by all cross-holding institutions in 
a firm. Cross-holding institution is defined as an institution that block-holds (at least 5%) the firm and 
block-holds at least one same-industry peer (SIC 4 digits) in the same quarter. We first calculate 
TotalCrossOwn for each quarter for each firm. Then we calculate yearly average TotalCrossOwn for each 
firm. Then, Average TotalCrossOwn for the year is obtained from the average of TotalCrossOwn across all 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean STD P10 P25 Median P75 P90
CrossDummy 15239 0.777 0.416 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
NConnected 15239 5.318 8.881 0.000 0.250 2.000 5.750 15.250
NCross 15239 1.315 1.213 0.000 0.250 1.000 2.000 3.000
AvgNum 15239 2.833 4.120 0.000 0.250 1.375 3.438 7.500
TotalCrossOwn 15239 0.109 0.106 0.000 0.015 0.084 0.169 0.260
IO 15239 0.694 0.276 0.277 0.519 0.750 0.896 0.992
RET 15239 0.175 0.805 -0.435 -0.202 0.065 0.351 0.778
X 15239 0.007 0.187 -0.120 0.006 0.048 0.075 0.113
R2 13215 0.329 0.248 0.028 0.118 0.293 0.497 0.685
X2 14454 0.044 0.710 -0.232 -0.011 0.096 0.171 0.286
SIZE 15239 13.154 1.614 11.054 12.150 13.209 14.142 15.169
BTM 14744 -0.699 0.827 -1.680 -1.126 -0.647 -0.199 0.222
Q 12775 1.891 1.347 0.941 1.127 1.470 2.101 3.283
CAPXRND 13094 10.682 12.358 1.729 3.576 7.200 13.358 22.916
Investment 13186 14.469 19.393 2.020 4.547 9.304 17.936 31.384
RND 13186 4.492 9.522 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.258 14.242
DisExp 13186 5.961 10.577 0.000 0.000 2.017 7.692 16.373
VR 44598 0.314 0.233 0.054 0.134 0.276 0.453 0.618
Panel B: Correlations
Variable CrossDummy NConnected NCross AvgNum TotalCrossOwn IO RET X R2 X2 SIZE BTM Q CAPXRND Investment RND DisExp
CrossDummy 0.321 0.581 0.368 0.551 0.341 -0.038 -0.026 0.105 -0.018 0.173 -0.007 -0.015 0.018 0.014 0.074 0.048
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.41] [0.09] [0.05] [0.12] [0.00] [0.00]
NConnected 0.725 0.660 0.904 0.628 0.208 -0.026 -0.048 0.014 -0.027 0.112 -0.095 0.110 0.221 0.144 0.321 0.267
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
NCross 0.726 0.891 0.502 0.953 0.392 -0.054 -0.044 0.082 -0.033 0.127 0.014 0.006 0.066 0.044 0.150 0.112
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [0.48] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
AvgNum 0.725 0.982 0.820 0.477 0.160 -0.018 -0.045 0.019 -0.021 0.116 -0.090 0.105 0.213 0.136 0.300 0.248
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.03] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
TotalCrossOwn 0.725 0.871 0.974 0.805 0.387 -0.053 -0.063 0.055 -0.055 0.111 0.005 0.019 0.075 0.042 0.157 0.120
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.52] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
IO 0.328 0.339 0.424 0.302 0.417 -0.047 0.134 0.396 -0.052 0.528 -0.119 0.025 -0.140 -0.069 -0.102 -0.090
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RET -0.043 -0.053 -0.061 -0.045 -0.066 -0.009 0.002 0.026 0.099 -0.163 0.135 0.234 0.120 0.116 0.063 0.075
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.28] [0.84] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
X -0.076 -0.140 -0.118 -0.128 -0.126 0.077 0.300 0.152 0.263 0.190 -0.199 0.032 -0.058 0.012 -0.131 -0.117
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.00] [0.00]
R2 0.138 0.105 0.142 0.102 0.119 0.451 0.094 0.185 0.077 0.592 -0.066 0.002 -0.129 -0.095 -0.161 -0.151
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.85] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
X2 -0.069 -0.126 -0.106 -0.115 -0.116 0.025 0.404 0.500 0.152 0.051 -0.015 -0.011 -0.053 -0.029 -0.075 -0.060
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.08] [0.24] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
SIZE 0.164 0.143 0.150 0.141 0.144 0.531 -0.083 0.116 0.629 0.045 -0.334 0.127 -0.103 -0.064 -0.096 -0.092
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
BTM -0.003 -0.023 0.035 -0.029 0.026 -0.130 0.117 0.023 -0.089 0.068 -0.357 -0.639 -0.238 -0.205 -0.263 -0.285
[0.73] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Q -0.010 0.049 -0.029 0.054 -0.021 0.100 0.253 0.002 0.089 0.043 0.244 -0.786 0.353 0.257 0.396 0.415
[0.27] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.84] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
CAPXRND 0.034 0.197 0.078 0.196 0.078 -0.089 0.083 -0.096 -0.110 -0.085 -0.031 -0.293 0.368 0.611 0.703 0.615
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Investment 0.026 0.159 0.062 0.157 0.060 -0.025 0.127 -0.015 -0.066 -0.018 0.001 -0.299 0.377 0.801 0.477 0.413
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.04] [0.94] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RND 0.076 0.232 0.122 0.230 0.114 -0.040 0.003 -0.216 -0.103 -0.172 -0.023 -0.242 0.308 0.544 0.462 0.875
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.76] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
DisExp 0.048 0.267 0.112 0.248 0.120 -0.090 0.075 -0.117 -0.151 -0.060 -0.092 -0.285 0.415 0.615 0.413 0.875
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
This table provides the summary statistics of main variables in the difference-in-difference tests that use financial institution mergers during 1980-2014 as exogenous shocks to common ownership. Panel A shows the
descriptive statistics of key variables, and Panel B reports the correlations. The upper right corner of Panel B reports Pearson correlations and the lower left corner of the panel provides Spearman correlations. The
variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The sample consists US public firms that are block-held by merging institutions during the period of t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the merger announcement
year.
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Table 2: Institutional Merger – The Effects on the Common Ownership
Panel A: Pre-M&A Period
Variable Controls Treatment Treatment - Controls
N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Diff t Value Pr > |t|
CrossDummy 7071 0.75 1.00 499 0.74 1.00 -0.01 [-0.56] 0.58
NConnected 7071 4.28 1.50 499 5.53 1.75 1.25 [3.19] 0.00
NCross 7071 1.17 1.00 499 1.11 1.00 -0.06 [-1.16] 0.25
AvgNum 7071 2.30 1.13 499 2.96 1.38 0.66 [3.77] 0.00
TotalCrossOwn 7071 0.10 0.07 499 0.09 0.07 -0.01 [-1.29] 0.20
Panel B: Post-M&A Period
Variable Controls Treatment Treatment - Controls
N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Diff t Value Pr > |t|
CrossDummy 6666 0.80 1.00 508 0.87 1.00 0.07 [4.20] 0.00
NConnected 6666 6.07 2.25 508 7.81 4.00 1.75 [3.78] 0.00
NCross 6666 1.46 1.25 508 1.56 1.50 0.10 [1.73] 0.08
AvgNum 6666 3.25 1.63 508 4.07 2.54 0.82 [3.69] 0.00
TotalCrossOwn 6666 0.12 0.10 508 0.13 0.11 0.01 [2.75] 0.01
Panel C: Regressions of Common Ownership on Treat and Post dummies
Variables CrossDummy NConnected NumCross AvgNum TotalCrossOwn
Treat 0.025 [1.15] -1.074 [-3.43] 0.024 [0.46] -0.428 [-2.57] 0.001 [0.22]
Post 0.012 [1.45] 0.154 [1.32] 0.069 [3.61] 0.019 [0.30] 0.007 [4.05]
Treat × Post 0.046 [2.12] 0.973 [3.12] 0.159 [3.14] 0.489 [2.96] 0.015 [3.38]
Size 0.036 [5.99] 0.750 [8.65] 0.115 [8.18] 0.314 [6.82] 0.010 [8.28]
BTM 0.030 [4.54] 0.476 [5.05] 0.156 [10.19] 0.191 [3.81] 0.013 [9.76]
AssetG 0.012 [1.73] 0.046 [0.45] 0.019 [1.11] -0.010 [-0.18] 0.000 [0.15]
Loss 0.000 [-0.03] 0.165 [1.38] 0.051 [2.65] 0.024 [0.38] 0.006 [3.20]
N 14744 14744 14744 14744 14744
RSQ 53.6% 78.2% 69.4% 71.9% 68.1%
Fixed Effects Firm + Year Firm + Year Firm + Year Firm + Year Firm + Year
This table provides the analyses of the effect of institution mergers on the common ownership. Panels A and B provide the summary statistics of the
common ownership variables pre and post institutional mergers, respectively. Panel C reports the difference-in-difference tests using the common
ownership variables as the dependent variables. A firm is classified as a treatment if it is block-held by one of the merging institutions during the
quarter immediately before the merger announcement date and at least one of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger
during the same pre-merger quarter. A firm is considered as a control if it is block-held by the same institution (that holds the treatment) and none of
its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one
if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is a control. Post is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period.
The sample period is t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the merger announcement year.
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Table 3: Regression of Annual Returns on the Current and Future Earnings
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lagged X -0.975 -0.747 -0.988 -0.775 -0.993 -0.774 -0.972 -0.740 -0.958 -0.717
[-5.61] [-4.58] [-5.97] [-4.96] [-6.00] [-4.96] [-5.68] [-4.59] [-5.90] [-4.69]
X 0.270 0.382 0.266 0.310 0.276 0.326 0.311 0.378 0.353 0.407
[1.25] [2.33] [1.26] [1.89] [1.32] [2.01] [1.48] [2.27] [1.70] [2.49]
X2 1.030 0.800 0.962 0.737 0.970 0.741 1.008 0.782 0.960 0.753
[3.71] [5.71] [3.36] [5.14] [3.39] [5.20] [3.36] [5.13] [3.77] [5.31]
R2 -0.182 -0.186 -0.197 -0.186 -0.194 -0.184 -0.198 -0.194 -0.198 -0.196
[-5.36] [-6.65] [-5.52] [-6.30] [-5.51] [-6.28] [-5.80] [-6.15] [-5.71] [-6.10]
Lagged X × Post 0.250 0.165 0.389 0.260 0.400 0.259 0.406 0.232 0.382 0.195
[1.06] [0.82] [1.73] [1.33] [1.79] [1.32] [1.74] [1.16] [1.74] [1.00]
X × Post -0.894 -0.747 -0.751 -0.641 -0.761 -0.656 -0.794 -0.697 -0.808 -0.706
[-3.30] [-3.82] [-2.91] [-3.34] [-2.95] [-3.43] [-3.12] [-3.66] [-3.21] [-3.75]
X2 × Post -0.335 -0.158 -0.350 -0.146 -0.359 -0.149 -0.387 -0.194 -0.351 -0.167
[-0.99] [-0.70] [-1.03] [-0.64] [-1.06] [-0.65] [-1.09] [-0.80] [-1.10] [-0.71]
R2 × Post -0.032 -0.021 0.033 0.017 0.026 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.024 0.027
[-0.79] [-0.58] [0.80] [0.46] [0.64] [0.32] [0.37] [0.42] [0.59] [0.66]
Lagged X × Treat 0.527 0.482 0.432 0.445 0.44 0.444 0.433 0.642 0.394 0.557
[1.28] [0.96] [1.14] [0.95] [1.17] [0.96] [1.00] [1.33] [0.94] [1.22]
X × Treat 0.292 0.410 0.269 0.391 0.262 0.370 0.132 0.380 0.166 0.460
[0.80] [1.43] [0.82] [1.38] [0.80] [1.32] [0.40] [1.21] [0.51] [1.46]
X2 × Treat -0.963 -0.615 -0.900 -0.593 -0.920 -0.614 -1.040 -0.653 -0.977 -0.616
[-2.76] [-1.86] [-2.61] [-1.83] [-2.67] [-1.91] [-2.79] [-1.76] [-2.86] [-1.69]
R2 × Treat 0.007 -0.025 0.028 -0.013 0.025 -0.015 0.009 -0.027 -0.002 -0.028
[0.10] [-0.41] [0.45] [-0.22] [0.41] [-0.26] [0.15] [-0.42] [-0.04] [-0.44]
Lagged X × Post × Treat -0.804 -0.493 -0.804 -0.570 -0.814 -0.560 -0.817 -0.660 -0.743 -0.546
[-1.29] [-0.72] [-1.40] [-0.87] [-1.42] [-0.86] [-1.33] [-0.97] [-1.22] [-0.82]
X × Post × Treat -2.143 -3.128 -2.24 -3.141 -2.255 -3.112 -2.113 -2.998 -2.234 -3.219
[-1.18] [-2.22] [-1.27] [-2.22] [-1.28] [-2.21] [-1.23] [-2.13] [-1.28] [-2.27]
X2 × Post × Treat 2.065 2.157 2.017 2.142 2.031 2.163 1.938 2.036 1.878 1.977
[2.30] [2.78] [2.30] [2.76] [2.32] [2.79] [2.19] [2.48] [2.12] [2.41]
R2 × Post × Treat -0.063 -0.067 -0.079 -0.076 -0.075 -0.074 -0.062 -0.073 -0.061 -0.08
[-0.56] [-0.68] [-0.74] [-0.80] [-0.70] [-0.77] [-0.61] [-0.73] [-0.58] [-0.79]
Treat 0.016 0.008 -0.026 0.014 -0.057 -0.019
[0.27] [0.13] [-0.44] [0.24] [-0.97] [-0.34]
Post 0.146 0.058 0.012 0.024 -0.238 -0.134 -0.241 -0.127
[5.46] [2.47] [0.40] [0.81] [-2.94] [-1.98] [-2.90] [-1.85]
Treat × Post -0.108 -0.063 -0.035 -0.060 -0.040 -0.070 -0.061 -0.076 -0.046 -0.055
[-1.50] [-0.84] [-0.51] [-0.85] [-0.57] [-0.99] [-0.82] [-0.99] [-0.63] [-0.74]
InvME 12.988 13.116 13.122 12.925 12.626
[3.07] [3.06] [3.09] [3.06] [3.18]
BTM 0.477 0.402 0.407 0.441 0.44
[11.96] [10.72] [10.90] [10.73] [10.80]
AssetG 0.265 0.239 0.235 0.217 0.21
[8.27] [8.21] [8.23] [7.59] [7.55]
Loss -0.188 -0.185 -0.186 -0.196 -0.198
[-5.85] [-6.06] [-6.19] [-6.65] [-6.86]
IO -0.276 -0.16 -0.173 -0.21 -0.236
[-3.39] [-1.89] [-2.09] [-2.60] [-2.86]
Num_IO 0.108 0.055 0.062 0.075 0.08
[3.63] [1.95] [2.26] [2.82] [3.04]
Fixed Effects Firm Firm + Year Firm + Year + Merger Firm×Merger + Year Firm×Merger + Year×Merger
N 11,579 11,230 11,578 11,229 11,578 11,229 11,565 11,213 11,561 11,209
R2 34.6% 48.8% 42.1% 53.0% 42.4% 53.3% 45.4% 56.1% 47.1% 57.4%
This table reports the difference-in-difference test results using institution mergers as exogenous shocks to common ownership. The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold return for
year t, measured over the 12-month period ending three months after the firm's fiscal year t ̶ 1 end. The main independent variable is X2, which is the sum of income available to
common shareholders before extraordinary items for the two years following year t, deflated by market value of equity three months after the fiscal year t ̶ 1 end. R2 is the buy-and-hold
return for the two-year period following year t, starting three months after the year fiscal year-t end. IO is the total institutional ownership. Num_IO is the number of institutional
owners. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. A firm is classified as a treatment if it is block-held by one of the merging institutions during the quarter immediately before the
merger announcement date and at least one of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. A firm is considered as a
control if it is block-held by the same institution (that holds the treatment) and none of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-
merger quarter. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is a control. Post is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period and zero
for the pre-merger period. To avoid the simultaneity of X2 and R2 pre- and post-mergers, our sample periods are t-4 to t-2 and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the merger announcement
year. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 4: Variance Ratios
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treat × Post -0.016 -0.014 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017
[-2.56] [-2.24] [-2.62] [-2.49] [-2.54] [-2.42] [-2.38] [-2.25] [-2.57] [-2.49]
Size -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011
[-6.45] [-4.81] [-4.69] [-4.20] [-4.35]
InvPrc 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.013
[1.60] [2.03] [2.03] [1.92] [1.55]
Amihud 0.477 0.448 0.452 0.365 0.372
[1.85] [1.76] [1.79] [1.43] [1.52]
BidAsk Spread -0.056 -0.083 -0.081 -0.060 -0.056
[-1.74] [-2.55] [-2.49] [-1.79] [-1.70]
BTM 4.874 5.004 4.991 4.641 4.728
[2.31] [2.30] [2.30] [2.04] [2.06]
AnnRet 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
[1.12] [1.28] [1.22] [1.10] [1.11]
Volatility 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001
[0.33] [0.59] [0.61] [0.38] [0.20]
Gross Profitability 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
[0.34] [0.08] [0.10] [-0.30] [-0.18]
X -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
[-1.63] [-1.88] [-1.89] [-1.74] [-1.94]
IO -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
[-1.01] [-1.77] [-1.86] [-1.78] [-1.80]
Post -0.008 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003
[-4.60] [-4.75] [0.49] [-0.53] [0.26] [-0.43] [0.29] [-0.42]
Treat 0.025 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.016
[3.42] [2.87] [2.34] [2.23] [2.62] [2.51]
Fixed Effects Firm Firm + Year Firm + Year + Merger Firm×Merger + Year Firm×Merger + Year×Merger
N 51,727 50,660 51,727 50,660 51,727 50,660 51,727 50,660 51,727 50,660
R2 8.3% 8.6% 8.6% 8.8% 8.6% 8.8% 9.5% 9.7% 9.7% 9.9%
This table reports the difference-in-difference test using institution mergers as exogenous shocks to common ownership. The dependent variable is the quarterly variance ratios. The
variance ratio is calculated from the natural logarithm of absolute value of the ratio of the variance of 5-day returns in a given quarter to 5 times the variance of one-day returns in the
same quarter. A firm is classified as a treatment if it is block-held by one of the merging institutions during the quarter immediately before the merger announcement date and at least
one of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. A firm is considered as a control if it is block-held by the same
institution (that holds the treatment) and none of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. Treat is a dummy variable
that equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is a control. Post is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period. Definitions of
variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample period is t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the merger announcement year. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard
errors by firm level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 5: Geographical Distance and Social Connection
Panel A: Geographical Distance - Earnings Informativeness
Remote Peers Close Peers
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged X × Post × Treat -0.901 -0.786 -0.736 -0.450 -0.233 -0.273 -0.394 -0.368
[-0.72] [-0.62] [-0.52] [-0.34] [-0.43] [-0.50] [-0.71] [-0.68]
X × Post × Treat -4.855 -4.815 -4.526 -4.804 1.375 1.354 0.988 0.894
[-3.66] [-3.65] [-3.38] [-3.61] [1.85] [1.85] [1.34] [1.21]
X2 × Post × Treat 2.686 2.710 2.688 2.606 -0.317 -0.287 -0.557 -0.583
[3.90] [3.93] [3.64] [3.57] [-0.73] [-0.68] [-1.13] [-1.16]
R2 × Post × Treat -0.137 -0.136 -0.135 -0.138 0.225 0.232 0.242 0.224
[-1.45] [-1.42] [-1.26] [-1.25] [2.64] [2.74] [2.83] [2.60]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
N 11,229 11,229 11,213 11,209 11,229 11,229 11,213 11,209
R2 54.2% 54.5% 57.3% 58.6% 50.1% 50.4% 54.0% 55.3%
Panel B: Geographical Distance - Variance Ratio
Remote Peers Close Peers
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × Post -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.022 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009
[-2.11] [-2.09] [-2.08] [-2.45] [-1.26] [-1.21] [-1.01] [-0.98]
Post -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
[-0.68] [-0.53] [-0.49] [-0.99] [-0.61] [-0.60]
Treat 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.017
[1.40] [1.61] [1.54] [1.65]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
N 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660
R2 8.8% 8.8% 9.7% 9.9% 8.8% 8.8% 9.6% 9.8%
Panel C: Social Connection - Earnings Informativeness
Less Connected Peers More Connected Peers
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged X × Post × Treat -0.392 -0.380 -0.340 -0.169 -0.993 -0.998 -1.392 -1.352
[-0.41] [-0.40] [-0.32] [-0.17] [-1.28] [-1.28] [-1.79] [-1.76]
X × Post × Treat -3.813 -3.778 -3.667 -3.843 1.173 1.216 0.896 0.684
[-2.48] [-2.47] [-2.27] [-2.37] [1.40] [1.47] [1.02] [0.76]
X2 × Post × Treat 2.526 2.562 2.476 2.409 -0.394 -0.418 -0.492 -0.562
[3.29] [3.36] [3.02] [2.96] [-0.73] [-0.78] [-0.90] [-1.00]
R2 × Post × Treat -0.127 -0.130 -0.147 -0.160 0.080 0.085 0.079 0.072
[-1.03] [-1.04] [-1.08] [-1.14] [0.97] [1.02] [0.93] [0.83]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
N 11,229 11,229 11,213 11,209 11,229 11,229 11,213 11,209
R2 53.7% 54.0% 56.8% 58.0% 50.0% 50.4% 54.0% 55.3%
Panel D: Social Connection - Variance Ratio
Less Connected Peers More Connected Peers
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × Post -0.022 -0.021 -0.018 -0.021 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010
[-2.33] [-2.27] [-1.94] [-2.22] [-0.96] [-0.93] [-1.06] [-1.08]
Post -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
[-0.74] [-0.51] [-0.51] [-0.93] [-0.64] [-0.59]
Treat 0.022 0.023 0.005 0.006
[2.46] [2.56] [0.43] [0.60]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
N 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660 50,660
R2 8.8% 8.8% 9.7% 9.9% 8.8% 8.8% 9.6% 9.8%
This table studies whether common ownership facilitates information flow. First, we estimate the level of difficulty of information diffusion between treatment firms using the
geographical distance and social connection. The geographical distance (social connection) is the average distance (social connection) between treatment firms that are connected
through an institution merger. Then, we re-define the treatment group from the subsample of firms in the original treatment group that are above (below) median of the geographical
distance (or social connection) during the year immediately before the merger announcement year. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it
is a control. Post is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample period is t-3
to t-1 (t-4 to t-2 for earnings-return regressions) and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the merger announcement year. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level
and reported in parentheses.
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Table 6: Informed Trading and Bid-Ask Spread
Panel A: PIN
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treat × Post 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.012
[2.11] [3.18] [1.86] [2.47] [1.92] [2.53] [1.74] [2.28] [1.22] [1.95]
Size -0.033 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.030
[-17.56] [-15.36] [-15.39] [-14.76] [-15.52]
Amihud 1.266 1.294 1.288 1.267 1.174
[3.97] [4.36] [4.36] [4.30] [4.27]
Volatility -0.147 -0.394 -0.388 -0.359 -0.380
[-1.90] [-4.24] [-4.16] [-3.72] [-4.05]
BTM 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
[4.45] [4.94] [4.94] [4.75] [4.97]
Gross Profitability 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.006
[0.85] [1.11] [1.18] [1.05] [0.86]
X 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
[3.36] [3.41] [3.42] [3.37] [3.54]
IO -0.020 -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.026
[-3.81] [-5.44] [-5.44] [-5.46] [-5.23]
Post -0.024 -0.021 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008
[-11.66] [-11.50] [0.98] [-0.17] [-0.26] [-1.61] [-0.23] [-1.61]
Treat 0.007 -0.002 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007
[0.94] [-0.30] [-0.99] [-1.41] [-0.66] [-1.17]
Fixed Effects Firm Firm + Year Firm + Year + Merger Firm×Merger + Year Firm×Merger + Year×Merger
N 7,444 7,156 7,444 7,156 7,444 7,156 7,439 7,153 7,438 7,152
R2 71.1% 76.9% 74.1% 78.7% 74.2% 78.8% 75.4% 79.7% 76.3% 80.6%
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treat × Post -0.014 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005
[-2.39] [-1.47] [-1.82] [-1.72] [-1.89] [-1.82] [-2.07] [-1.97] [-2.11] [-1.91]
Size 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
[2.40] [2.62] [2.62] [2.84] [2.92]
Amihud -0.563 -0.524 -0.532 -0.459 -0.492
[-3.00] [-2.83] [-2.87] [-2.93] [-2.99]
Volatility 0.164 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160
[75.12] [63.92] [64.63] [66.88] [67.94]
BTM -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
[-0.29] [1.13] [1.32] [2.40] [2.41]
Gross Profitability 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008
[1.31] [1.78] [1.85] [1.94] [1.80]
X -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020
[-6.17] [-6.03] [-5.99] [-5.64] [-5.63]
IO -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[-0.30] [-1.57] [-1.55] [-1.64] [-1.65]
Post 0.015 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.004
[9.36] [-1.61] [0.72] [0.67] [3.77] [2.01] [3.83] [2.09]
Treat 0.026 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.014 0.001
[5.08] [1.34] [3.34] [0.43] [2.91] [0.61]
Fixed Effects Firm Firm + Year Firm + Year + Merger Firm×Merger + Year Firm×Merger + Year×Merger
N 13,522 12,787 13,522 12,787 13,522 12,787 13,518 12,779 13,517 12,777
R2 48.7% 88.6% 65.7% 89.3% 66.0% 89.4% 69.3% 90.0% 70.3% 90.3%
This table examines whether common ownership increases the likelihood of informed trading and reduces information asymmetry. Specifically, Panel A uses probability of informed trading (PIN)
as the dependent variable, and Panel B uses quarterly average bid-ask spread as the dependent variable. PIN is calculated following Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007). A firm is classified as a
treatment if it is block-held by one of the merging institutions during the quarter immediately before the merger announcement date and at least one of its same-industry rivals are block-held by
the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. A firm is considered as a control if it is block-held by the same institution (that holds the treatment) and none of its same-
industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is a
control. Post is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample period is t-3 to t-1 and t+1
to t+3, where year t is the merger announcement year. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: Stock Returns and Holding Changes
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ΔH 0.100 0.117 -0.442 -0.347 -0.399 -0.313 -0.457 -0.277 -0.425 -0.248
[0.30] [0.37] [-1.36] [-1.13] [-1.23] [-1.01] [-1.36] [-0.87] [-1.35] [-0.79]
ΔH × Post -0.643 -0.727 -0.637 -0.597 -0.704 -0.682 -0.697 -0.761 -0.376 -0.549
[-1.48] [-1.76] [-1.48] [-1.46] [-1.62] [-1.65] [-1.54] [-1.77] [-0.88] [-1.30]
ΔH × Treat -1.443 -1.997 -0.958 -1.600 -1.216 -1.867 -1.193 -1.807 -1.263 -1.895
[-1.32] [-1.69] [-0.97] [-1.54] [-1.24] [-1.83] [-1.09] [-1.72] [-1.16] [-1.77]
ΔH × Post × Treat 2.406 3.071 2.465 2.965 2.722 3.299 2.600 3.166 2.271 3.026
[2.09] [2.50] [2.38] [2.72] [2.62] [3.07] [2.26] [2.84] [1.97] [2.65]
X -0.621 -0.435 -0.515 -0.422 -0.511 -0.417 -0.470 -0.350 -0.446 -0.343
[-3.02] [-1.94] [-2.61] [-1.92] [-2.59] [-1.89] [-2.65] [-1.81] [-2.51] [-1.77]
X2 0.793 0.732 0.716 0.673 0.716 0.674 0.700 0.656 0.684 0.651
[4.07] [3.99] [3.72] [3.68] [3.72] [3.69] [3.63] [3.69] [3.70] [3.68]
R2 -0.197 -0.207 -0.181 -0.186 -0.182 -0.187 -0.192 -0.196 -0.190 -0.194
[-9.24] [-10.29] [-7.55] [-9.16] [-7.62] [-9.19] [-7.99] [-9.44] [-8.15] [-9.18]
Treat 0.017 0.009 -0.027 0.016 -0.053 -0.019
[0.31] [0.17] [-0.53] [0.32] [-1.09] [-0.39]
Post 0.101 0.024 -0.018 -0.001 -0.182 -0.078 -0.182 -0.071
[6.28] [1.28] [-0.61] [-0.04] [-2.52] [-1.34] [-2.42] [-1.17]
Treat × Post -0.006 0.039 0.077 0.046 0.069 0.035 0.018 -0.021 0.021 -0.009
[-0.08] [0.57] [1.13] [0.69] [1.03] [0.53] [0.33] [-0.37] [0.38] [-0.17]
InvME 14.230 14.156 14.200 14.083 13.767
[3.24] [3.20] [3.23] [3.15] [3.31]
BTM 0.494 0.412 0.418 0.456 0.452
[10.61] [9.35] [9.50] [9.77] [9.76]
AssetG 0.247 0.223 0.221 0.221 0.218
[4.35] [4.22] [4.21] [4.51] [4.46]
Loss -0.208 -0.203 -0.205 -0.209 -0.209
[-4.93] [-5.13] [-5.21] [-5.86] [-5.98]
IO -0.311 -0.163 -0.180 -0.271 -0.308
[-3.05] [-1.62] [-1.84] [-3.05] [-3.32]
Num_IO 0.101 0.041 0.048 0.075 0.086
[2.78] [1.20] [1.48] [2.63] [2.97]
Fixed Effects Firm Firm + Year Firm + Year + Merger Firm×Merger + Year Firm×Merger + Year×Merger
N 11,929 11,546 11,928 11,545 11,928 11,545 11,914 11,525 11,911 11,521
R2 26.8% 42.1% 35.4% 46.8% 35.7% 47.1% 39.4% 51.2% 41.3% 52.5%
This table examines the relation between stock returns and contemporaneous trading activities, proxied by holding changes, of merging institutions. The holding change (ΔH) of a merging
institution for Firm i is defined from Hi,t – Hi,t-1, where Hi,t is the percentage holding by the institution in year t in Firm i. A firm is classified as a treatment if it is block-held by one of the
merging institutions during the quarter immediately before the merger announcement date and at least one of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger
during the same pre-merger quarter. A firm is considered as a control if it is block-held by the same institution (that holds the treatment) and none of its same-industry rivals are block-held
by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is a control. Post is a dummy
that equals one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A. The sample period is t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3, where
year t is the merger announcement year. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 8: Holding Changes and Price Informativeness
Panel A: Earnings Informativeness
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
X × Treat × Post × Below 0.392 0.090 0.383 0.132 0.079 -0.196 -0.022 -0.429
[0.83] [0.21] [0.81] [0.30] [0.15] [-0.41] [-0.04] [-0.90]
X2 × Treat × Post × Below 0.486 0.369 0.489 0.387 0.403 0.318 0.304 0.226
[1.20] [0.80] [1.21] [0.85] [0.92] [0.64] [0.72] [0.46]
X × Treat × Post × Above -6.908 -6.590 -6.995 -6.596 -6.967 -6.477 -6.983 -6.541
[-3.77] [-4.76] [-3.82] [-4.79] [-3.49] [-4.42] [-3.56] [-4.50]
X2 × Treat × Post × Above 2.218 2.078 2.224 2.098 2.033 1.914 1.991 1.869
[3.56] [4.18] [3.60] [4.25] [3.01] [3.49] [3.02] [3.43]
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
N 11,578 11,229 11,578 11,229 11,565 11,213 11,561 11,209
R2 44.4% 54.4% 44.7% 54.7% 47.4% 57.3% 49.1% 58.6%
Panel B: Variance Ratio
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × Post × Below -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.021
[-2.01] [-1.97] [-1.96] [-1.93] [-1.68] [-1.70] [-1.78] [-1.84]
Treat × Post × Above -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.025 -0.031 -0.030 -0.033 -0.032
[-2.65] [-2.55] [-2.55] [-2.45] [-2.95] [-2.86] [-3.08] [-2.99]
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Observations 34,315 33,695 34,315 33,695 34,296 33,677 34,295 33,676
R-squared 9.6% 9.8% 9.7% 9.9% 11.2% 11.4% 11.5% 11.6%
This table investigates the relation between the improvement of price efficiency and common owners’ trading activities. Specifically, we introduce a
dummy variable, Above (Below), that equals one if absolute value of holdings changes (|ΔH|) in year (quarter) t is above (below) the median value, zero
otherwise. Then, we interact Above (Below) with Treat dummy to analyze whether the effect of common ownership is stronger in the subsample of
treatment firms that are above (below) the median of |ΔH|. The holding change (ΔH) of a merging institution for Firm i is defined from Hi,t – Hi,t-1, where
Hi,t is the percentage holding by the institution in year (quarter) t in Firm i. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and
zero if it is a control. Post is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period. Definitions of variables are
provided in Appendix A. The sample period is t-3 to t-1 (t-4 to t-2 for earnings-return regressions) and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the merger
announcement year. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 9: Quasi-Natural Experiment – Q-Investment Relation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables CAPXRND Investment RND DisExp
Q 1.763 1.695 2.122 2.020 0.952 0.944 1.366 1.355
[6.64] [6.51] [4.74] [4.55] [4.39] [4.35] [4.64] [4.54]
CF 7.704 7.649 11.949 11.588 2.488 2.523 3.925 4.075
[3.10] [3.16] [1.76] [1.78] [1.54] [1.59] [2.24] [2.34]
Post × Q -0.179 -0.140 0.465 0.544 -0.423 -0.433 -0.781 -0.782
[-0.78] [-0.63] [1.28] [1.51] [-2.29] [-2.32] [-2.66] [-2.57]
Post × CF 1.437 1.405 5.799 5.903 2.805 2.834 1.036 0.965
[0.53] [0.54] [0.94] [0.99] [1.49] [1.51] [0.49] [0.46]
Treat × Q 0.179 0.362 -0.985 -0.848 -0.108 -0.045 -0.196 -0.137
[0.21] [0.42] [-0.90] [-0.76] [-0.18] [-0.08] [-0.29] [-0.20]
Treat × CF 2.011 1.647 0.264 0.647 0.040 -0.202 -0.006 -0.56
[0.31] [0.26] [0.02] [0.06] [0.01] [-0.05] [-0.00] [-0.14]
Treat × Post × Q 3.682 3.545 5.898 5.917 3.606 3.598 3.868 3.855
[1.96] [1.91] [1.71] [1.73] [2.13] [2.14] [2.21] [2.19]
Treat × Post × CF -7.657 -6.718 -28.108 -27.274 -7.497 -6.998 -7.359 -6.693
[-0.60] [-0.53] [-1.06] [-1.06] [-0.69] [-0.65] [-0.65] [-0.58]
INVAT 0.145 0.150 0.193 0.196 0.096 0.099 0.106 0.107
[3.88] [4.16] [3.24] [3.32] [3.09] [3.21] [3.38] [3.44]
Post -1.121 -2.076 0.321 0.888
[-1.61] [-1.78] [0.81] [1.43]
Treat × Post -3.755 -3.498 -4.681 -4.651 -5.497 -5.595 -6.223 -6.375
[-1.23] [-1.15] [-1.12] [-1.13] [-1.90] [-1.94] [-2.09] [-2.14]
Ret -0.057 -0.031 -0.123 -0.137 0.045 0.050 0.066 0.061
[-0.42] [-0.22] [-0.26] [-0.29] [0.50] [0.55] [0.71] [0.69]
LEV -6.736 -6.893 -23.661 -23.925 -1.813 -1.870 -2.190 -2.199
[-5.72] [-6.12] [-8.02] [-8.30] [-2.86] [-2.87] [-2.18] [-2.17]
CASH -2.991 -2.796 4.248 4.490 -2.668 -2.695 -2.332 -2.278
[-3.63] [-3.50] [2.21] [2.44] [-3.77] [-3.83] [-2.71] [-2.62]
SALEG 0.576 0.561 -0.865 -0.899 0.301 0.271 0.551 0.525
[1.37] [1.42] [-1.50] [-1.64] [0.96] [0.86] [1.56] [1.46]
Tangibility 8.899 8.975 13.700 13.389 1.494 1.596 1.295 1.326
[5.00] [5.12] [3.20] [3.16] [2.22] [2.37] [1.63] [1.60]
IO -1.013 -0.952 -0.630 -0.214 -1.392 -1.370 -1.263 -1.242
[-1.40] [-1.35] [-0.38] [-0.13] [-2.65] [-2.64] [-2.04] [-2.01]
KZ4 0.172 0.167 -0.058 -0.043 -0.007 -0.003 -0.046 -0.050
[0.91] [0.89] [-0.12] [-0.09] [-0.05] [-0.02] [-0.17] [-0.19]
Fixed Effects F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
N 11,533 11,531 11,597 11,595 11,597 11,595 11,597 11,595
R2 77.7% 78.2% 48.2% 49.4% 86.2% 86.4% 84.2% 84.4%
This table uses institution mergers as exogenous shock to common ownership to examine the effects of common ownership on the Q-investment sensitivity.
We use CAPXRND, Investment, RND, and DisExp as proxies for corporate investment. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of total assets minus book
value of equity, scaled by book value of total assets. All independent variables are measured at t-1, except CF, R3, and KZ4, which are contemporaneous with
the dependent variables. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A. A firm is classified as a treatment if it is block-held by one of the merging
institutions during the quarter immediately before the merger announcement date and at least one of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party
to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. A firm is considered as a control if it is block-held by the same institution (that holds the treatment) and
none of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one
if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is a control. Post is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period. The
sample period is t-3 to t-1 and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the merger announcement year. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm
level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 10: Robustness – Alternative Control Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A Annual Returns
X × Post × Treat -2.657 -3.74 -2.685 -3.756 -2.367 -3.472 -2.559 -3.548
[-1.55] [-2.66] [-1.56] [-2.70] [-1.40] [-2.41] [-1.41] [-2.43]
X2 × Post × Treat 2.268 1.675 2.269 1.658 2.006 1.428 1.933 1.435
[2.18] [2.13] [2.16] [2.13] [1.93] [1.73] [1.93] [1.77]
N 4,004 3,879 4,004 3,879 4,003 3,878 3,993 3,868
R2 36.4% 56.7% 36.6% 57.0% 37.3% 57.7% 40.6% 60.6%
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B Variance Ratios
Treat × Post -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
[-1.68] [-1.74] [-1.71] [-1.78] [-1.72] [-1.74] [-1.73] [-1.78]
N 20,034 19,124 20,034 19,124 20,034 19,124 20,034 19,124
R2 11.1% 11.8% 11.2% 11.9% 11.3% 12.0% 12.0% 12.6%
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel C CAPXRND Investment RND DisExp
Treat × Post × Q 3.785 3.525 5.465 5.285 3.267 2.974 3.092 2.912
[2.00] [1.97] [1.61] [1.69] [1.97] [1.93] [1.70] [1.71]
N 4,275 4,260 4,326 4,311 4,326 4,311 4,326 4,311
R2 60.4% 62.2% 39.5% 41.5% 81.7% 82.9% 81.6% 82.7%
Fixed Effects F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls Yes
This table utilizes an alternative control group to test the robustness of our main difference-in-difference analyses based on institution mergers as exogenous shocks. A firm is
classified as a treatment if it is block-held by one of the merging institutions during the quarter immediately before the merger announcement date and at least one of its same-
industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. We identify firms in the alternative control sample as follows. First, for each
treatment firm, we select firms that are in the same SIC 4-digit industry group with the treatment firm, but are not block-held by the merging institutions. Then, we match five
closest firms to each treatment firm based on size. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is a control. Post is a dummy that equals
one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period. The sample period is t-3 to t-1 (t-4 to t-2 for earnings-return regressions) and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the
merger announcement year. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in
parentheses.
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Table 11: Falsificaton Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A Annual Returns
X × Post × Treat 0.375 0.335 0.361 0.31 0.358 0.35 0.432 0.416
[0.94] [0.94] [0.90] [0.87] [0.89] [0.95] [1.10] [1.15]
X2 × Post × Treat -0.035 -0.311 -0.032 -0.306 0.023 -0.277 -0.051 -0.332
[-0.08] [-1.04] [-0.07] [-1.02] [0.05] [-0.89] [-0.13] [-1.11]
N 11,572 11,285 11,572 11,285 11,541 11,251 11,539 11,248
R2 33.5% 45.5% 33.8% 45.8% 35.1% 47.5% 36.5% 48.5%
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B Variance Ratios
Treat × Post 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001
[0.53] [0.48] [0.50] [0.41] [0.59] [0.48] [0.33] [0.12]
N 51,937 49,626 51,937 49,626 51,937 49,626 51,937 49,626
R2 9.2% 9.6% 9.3% 9.7% 10.3% 10.6% 10.5% 10.9%
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y +M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel C CAPXRND Investment RND DisExp
Treat × Post × Q 0.129 0.228 -0.003 0.142 -0.273 -0.248 -0.595 -0.574
[0.15] [0.26] [-0.00] [0.12] [-0.50] [-0.46] [-1.04] [-1.02]
N 11,716 11,715 11,798 11,797 11,798 11,797 11,798 11,797
R2 73.0% 73.7% 44.6% 45.7% 82.9% 83.0% 82.8% 82.9%
Fixed Effects F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls Yes
This table reports the falsification test results. The sample period for the tests is t-7 to t-5 and t-3 to t-1, where t is the merger announcement year. We use year t-4 as the base
year for the tests. Post is a dummy that equals one for the period between t-3 and t-1 and zero otherwise. A firm is classified as a treatment if it is block-held by one of the
merging institutions during the quarter immediately before the merger announcement date and at least one of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the
merger during the same pre-merger quarter. A firm is considered as a control if it is block-held by the same institution (that holds the treatment) and none of its same-industry
rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is
a control. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 12: Excluding Financial Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A Annual Returns
X × Post × Treat -0.180 -0.479 -0.177 -0.455 -0.289 -0.627 -0.320 -0.748
[-0.34] [-1.05] [-0.33] [-1.01] [-0.52] [-1.34] [-0.56] [-1.55]
X2 × Post × Treat 1.350 0.953 1.363 0.983 1.374 0.948 1.252 0.845
[2.45] [1.82] [2.48] [1.87] [2.48] [1.71] [2.41] [1.55]
N 4,070 3,924 4,070 3,924 4,065 3,919 4,061 3,915
R2 46.8% 55.9% 47.1% 56.1% 47.6% 56.6% 49.7% 58.5%
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y + M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B Variance Ratios
Treat × Post -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.020 -0.020
[-2.55] [-2.37] [-2.51] [-2.31] [-2.36] [-2.22] [-2.56] [-2.45]
N 20,601 19,877 20,601 19,877 20,601 19,877 20,601 19,877
R2 11.6% 12.0% 11.7% 12.0% 12.0% 12.3% 12.4% 12.7%
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y + M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel C CAPXRND Investment RND DisExp
Treat × Post × Q 4.665 4.546 6.608 6.679 3.877 3.895 3.893 3.887
[2.34] [2.26] [1.77] [1.78] [2.14] [2.13] [2.11] [2.08]
N 4,478 4,476 4,533 4,531 4,533 4,531 4,533 4,531
R2 74.3% 75.1% 47.6% 49.6% 81.6% 81.9% 80.6% 81.0%
Fixed Effects F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M F × M + Y F × M + Y × M
Controls Yes
This table studies whether our results are driven by mergers during the financial crisis. Specifically, we run the main difference-in-difference test, excluding the institutional
mergers for which effective dates are in the period of the financial crisis. We define the period of 07/2007 to 12/2009 as the financial crisis period. A firm is classified as a
treatment if it is block-held by one of the merging institutions during the quarter immediately before the merger announcement date and at least one of its same-industry
rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. A firm is considered as a control if it is block-held by the same institution (that
holds the treatment) and none of its same-industry rivals are block-held by the other party to the merger during the same pre-merger quarter. Treat is a dummy variable that
equals one if a firm is a treatment stock and zero if it is a control. Post is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period and zero for the pre-merger period. The sample
period is t-3 to t-1 (t-4 to t-2 for earnings-return regressions) and t+1 to t+3, where year t is the merger announcement year. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix
A. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics - OLS
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean STD P10 P25 Median P75 P90
CrossDummy 114661 0.427 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
NConnected 114661 2.199 5.651 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.750 6.000
NCross 114661 0.548 0.869 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.750
AvgNum 114661 1.380 3.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.375 4.000
TotalCrossOwn 114661 0.046 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.154
IO 114661 0.358 0.306 0.007 0.078 0.295 0.593 0.814
X 114661 -0.025 0.238 -0.238 -0.049 0.039 0.079 0.131
X3 95472 0.012 0.640 -0.598 -0.153 0.114 0.282 0.532
RET 113865 0.179 0.916 -0.526 -0.268 0.034 0.384 0.893
R3 89904 0.515 1.826 -0.677 -0.343 0.154 0.810 1.835
SIZE 114661 11.748 2.168 9.050 10.159 11.601 13.215 14.638
BTM 111090 -0.680 0.961 -1.858 -1.205 -0.600 -0.062 0.413
Variance Ratio (Annual) 114198 0.267 0.203 0.040 0.103 0.222 0.389 0.571
Amihud 112092 0.007 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.010
BidAsk Spread 114661 0.192 0.096 0.092 0.123 0.173 0.239 0.319
Q 107170 1.956 2.061 0.855 1.038 1.381 2.099 3.495
AssetGrowth 106175 12.382 40.085 -19.522 -4.882 5.536 18.833 44.863
CAPXRND 104940 12.590 13.691 1.683 3.888 8.351 16.034 27.893
Panel B: Correlations
CrossDummy NConnected NCross AvgNum TotalCrossOwn IO X X3 AnnRet R3 SIZE BTM VR Q AssetGrowth CAPXRND
CrossDummy 0.450 0.731 0.516 0.686 0.537 0.029 0.032 0.006 0.002 0.338 -0.016 -0.168 -0.005 -0.008 0.037
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.46] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [0.01] [0.00]
NConnected 0.951 0.704 0.911 0.668 0.364 -0.006 -0.013 0.007 0.003 0.228 -0.078 -0.115 0.067 0.006 0.123
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.02] [0.38] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00]
NCross 0.952 0.977 0.599 0.952 0.559 0.013 0.015 0.000 0.002 0.310 -0.018 -0.156 0.012 -0.014 0.041
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [1.00] [0.50] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
AvgNum 0.951 0.997 0.965 0.567 0.338 -0.003 -0.007 0.012 0.005 0.228 -0.068 -0.113 0.059 0.007 0.124
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.29] [0.02] [0.00] [0.14] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
TotalCrossOwn 0.951 0.972 0.994 0.961 0.543 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.288 -0.021 -0.146 0.015 -0.013 0.044
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.86] [0.24] [0.57] [0.60] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
IO 0.552 0.558 0.582 0.546 0.583 0.167 0.140 0.028 -0.029 0.713 -0.086 -0.312 0.014 0.015 -0.063
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
X -0.001 -0.021 -0.012 -0.020 -0.014 0.183 0.452 0.077 -0.039 0.218 -0.121 -0.099 -0.014 0.129 -0.066
[0.87] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
X3 0.017 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.180 0.545 0.052 0.230 0.160 0.051 -0.073 -0.081 0.039 -0.154
[0.00] [0.87] [0.01] [0.54] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
AnnRet 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.121 0.377 0.329 -0.077 -0.077 0.114 -0.094 0.217 0.266 0.127
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
R3 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.020 0.021 0.074 0.127 0.500 -0.049 -0.047 0.091 0.014 -0.087 0.002 -0.021
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.62] [0.00]
SIZE 0.362 0.365 0.375 0.358 0.373 0.774 0.167 0.159 0.018 0.064 -0.273 -0.349 0.107 0.008 -0.017
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
BTM -0.030 -0.039 -0.026 -0.038 -0.029 -0.106 0.100 0.132 0.150 0.152 -0.302 0.106 -0.549 -0.180 -0.293
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Variance Ratio -0.150 -0.153 -0.156 -0.151 -0.155 -0.292 -0.086 -0.078 -0.122 -0.014 -0.335 0.105 -0.080 -0.085 -0.048
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Q 0.051 0.067 0.052 0.066 0.054 0.151 -0.049 -0.045 0.225 -0.178 0.284 -0.784 -0.146 0.256 0.365
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
AssetGrowth 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.090 0.285 0.303 0.354 0.040 0.093 -0.201 -0.111 0.297 0.336
[0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
CAPXRND 0.063 0.095 0.064 0.096 0.065 0.020 -0.042 -0.071 0.105 -0.072 0.073 -0.303 -0.070 0.391 0.293
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of key variables, and Panel B reports the correlations. The upper right corner of Panel B reports Pearson correlations and the lower left corner of
the panel provides Spearman correlations. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The sample includes US public firms for the period of 1980–2014.
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Table A2: Regressions of Annual Returns on Current and Future Earnings
Panel A: Pooled Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables CrossDummy NConnected NCross AvgNum TotalCrossOwn CO Index
Lagged X -0.665 -0.407 -0.664 -0.435 -0.655 -0.444 -0.672 -0.437 -0.665 -0.443 -0.662 -0.417
[-13.52] [-5.15] [-9.25] [-4.79] [-9.06] [-4.91] [-9.41] [-4.79] [-9.21] [-4.89] [-9.94] [-4.65]
X 0.476 0.600 0.380 0.488 0.363 0.482 0.392 0.503 0.397 0.517 0.452 0.569
[8.04] [5.60] [3.90] [3.82] [3.69] [3.70] [4.14] [3.82] [4.05] [4.00] [5.22] [4.46]
X3 0.114 -0.071 0.086 -0.097 0.054 -0.134 0.092 -0.096 0.065 -0.126 0.080 -0.111
[4.09] [-1.75] [2.08] [-1.91] [1.30] [-2.64] [2.23] [-1.88] [1.58] [-2.44] [2.11] [-2.25]
R3 -0.077 -0.094 -0.078 -0.096 -0.08 -0.097 -0.079 -0.097 -0.081 -0.097 -0.079 -0.098
[-11.72] [-7.69] [-8.28] [-6.35] [-8.22] [-6.29] [-8.23] [-6.20] [-8.26] [-6.25] [-8.96] [-6.59]
CO -0.053 -0.056 -0.106 -0.138 -0.111 -0.141 -0.097 -0.126 -0.111 -0.140 -0.097 -0.120
[-5.06] [-4.20] [-5.78] [-5.85] [-6.29] [-5.93] [-5.43] [-5.59] [-6.35] [-5.84] [-5.95] [-5.54]
Lagged X × CO -0.008 -0.142 0.002 -0.098 -0.018 -0.087 0.018 -0.095 0.001 -0.09 -0.005 -0.132
[-0.11] [-2.01] [0.02] [-0.90] [-0.15] [-0.81] [0.16] [-0.87] [0.01] [-0.83] [-0.05] [-1.30]
X × CO -0.393 -0.373 -0.152 -0.184 -0.119 -0.172 -0.175 -0.21 -0.189 -0.234 -0.305 -0.323
[-4.20] [-3.66] [-0.99] [-1.24] [-0.76] [-1.13] [-1.15] [-1.35] [-1.23] [-1.57] [-2.18] [-2.26]
X3 × CO 0.098 0.122 0.138 0.162 0.207 0.234 0.127 0.158 0.183 0.216 0.157 0.189
[2.43] [2.91] [2.06] [2.44] [3.08] [3.53] [1.89] [2.34] [2.75] [3.25] [2.56] [3.05]
R3 × CO 0.008 0.023 0.009 0.026 0.014 0.028 0.011 0.027 0.015 0.028 0.012 0.029
[0.84] [1.96] [0.62] [1.35] [0.84] [1.36] [0.69] [1.32] [0.92] [1.34] [0.83] [1.61]
InvME 1.830 1.764 1.763 1.767 1.765 1.783
[5.67] [5.61] [5.60] [5.61] [5.61] [5.62]
BTM 0.317 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.319
[25.99] [26.07] [26.08] [26.10] [26.06] [26.05]
AssetGrowth 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.135
[5.56] [5.53] [5.52] [5.53] [5.53] [5.55]
Loss -0.276 -0.274 -0.272 -0.274 -0.273 -0.275
[-19.34] [-19.52] [-19.47] [-19.42] [-19.50] [-19.46]
IO -0.003 -0.032 -0.034 -0.025 -0.033 -0.029
[-0.13] [-1.23] [-1.25] [-1.00] [-1.24] [-1.06]
Lagged X × IO -0.285 -0.239 -0.231 -0.241 -0.233 -0.251
[-2.41] [-2.08] [-2.01] [-2.09] [-2.03] [-2.16]
X × IO -0.422 -0.311 -0.305 -0.317 -0.319 -0.351
[-2.29] [-1.78] [-1.75] [-1.79] [-1.83] [-1.96]
X3 × IO 0.534 0.527 0.532 0.528 0.532 0.534
[7.82] [7.88] [7.99] [7.87] [7.96] [7.91]
R3 × IO -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021
[-1.36] [-1.28] [-1.32] [-1.27] [-1.32] [-1.27]
N 78,693 76,731 78,693 76,731 78,693 76,731 78,693 76,731 78,693 76,731 78,693 76,731
RSQ 21.4% 29.9% 21.3% 29.7% 21.3% 29.8% 21.3% 29.7% 21.3% 29.8% 21.3% 29.8%
Panel B: Fama MacBeth Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables CrossDummy NConnected NCross AvgNum TotalCrossOwn CO Index
Lagged X -0.630 -0.367 -0.640 -0.316 -0.638 -0.319 -0.645 -0.320 -0.650 -0.323 -0.636 -0.324
[-6.72] [-5.26] [-5.78] [-3.53] [-5.82] [-3.62] [-5.80] [-3.50] [-5.90] [-3.61] [-6.05] [-3.90]
X(t) 0.491 0.485 0.496 0.535 0.511 0.548 0.497 0.537 0.537 0.569 0.505 0.529
[7.44] [5.60] [6.07] [4.88] [6.12] [4.98] [6.17] [4.88] [6.59] [5.27] [6.70] [5.17]
X3 0.115 -0.033 0.079 -0.092 0.067 -0.101 0.080 -0.091 0.071 -0.097 0.085 -0.078
[4.09] [-1.00] [2.30] [-2.38] [1.96] [-2.59] [2.37] [-2.38] [2.16] [-2.58] [2.74] [-2.14]
R3 -0.041 -0.044 -0.039 -0.044 -0.037 -0.042 -0.039 -0.044 -0.038 -0.043 -0.039 -0.043
[-4.74] [-5.30] [-5.14] [-4.45] [-5.23] [-4.48] [-5.00] [-4.48] [-5.38] [-4.60] [-5.10] [-4.78]
CO -0.034 0.017 -0.049 0.042 -0.061 0.023 -0.048 0.042 -0.060 0.026 -0.051 0.029
[-2.38] [0.99] [-1.88] [1.36] [-2.40] [0.79] [-1.90] [1.39] [-2.36] [0.89] [-2.21] [1.07]
Lagged X × CO -0.096 -0.271 -0.114 -0.392 -0.115 -0.397 -0.102 -0.375 -0.092 -0.394 -0.113 -0.376
[-1.03] [-2.68] [-0.76] [-2.35] [-0.81] [-2.49] [-0.66] [-2.25] [-0.64] [-2.42] [-0.83] [-2.49]
X × CO 0.020 -0.016 -0.001 -0.094 -0.026 -0.117 -0.003 -0.098 -0.083 -0.164 -0.012 -0.083
[0.24] [-0.19] [-0.01] [-0.70] [-0.20] [-0.85] [-0.03] [-0.72] [-0.66] [-1.23] [-0.10] [-0.67]
X3 × CO 0.108 0.120 0.157 0.196 0.185 0.217 0.156 0.194 0.174 0.210 0.154 0.182
[3.42] [3.86] [3.39] [3.88] [4.00] [4.50] [3.35] [3.83] [4.03] [4.67] [3.60] [4.11]
R3 × CO -0.014 -0.005 -0.019 -0.005 -0.024 -0.008 -0.018 -0.004 -0.022 -0.007 -0.019 -0.005
[-1.40] [-0.54] [-1.44] [-0.35] [-1.67] [-0.61] [-1.37] [-0.28] [-1.66] [-0.57] [-1.49] [-0.45]
InvME 1.987 2.040 1.972 2.045 1.986 2.015
[7.57] [7.68] [7.64] [7.66] [7.68] [7.67]
BTM 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087
[5.03] [4.98] [4.96] [4.99] [4.99] [4.99]
AssetGrowth 0.184 0.183 0.184 0.183 0.184 0.184
[6.05] [6.05] [6.03] [6.06] [6.04] [6.04]
Loss -0.127 -0.128 -0.129 -0.128 -0.129 -0.128
[-8.46] [-8.39] [-8.41] [-8.40] [-8.35] [-8.40]
IO 0.087 0.090 0.085 0.091 0.085 0.088
[2.93] [2.98] [2.87] [3.00] [2.85] [2.92]
Lagged X × IO -0.519 -0.514 -0.505 -0.520 -0.503 -0.516
[-4.42] [-4.32] [-4.33] [-4.28] [-4.46] [-4.39]
X × IO -0.266 -0.280 -0.277 -0.281 -0.276 -0.278
[-2.27] [-2.34] [-2.32] [-2.35] [-2.31] [-2.33]
X3 × IO 0.420 0.425 0.424 0.425 0.422 0.424
[7.86] [7.95] [7.93] [7.94] [7.84] [7.89]
R3 × IO -0.033 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.034
[-2.14] [-2.23] [-2.26] [-2.20] [-2.25] [-2.21]
Avg. N 2402 2334 2402 2334 2402 2334 2402 2334 2402 2334 2402 2334
Avg. R2 9.9% 18.4% 9.8% 18.4% 9.8% 18.3% 9.8% 18.4% 9.8% 18.3% 9.8% 18.4%
This table reports the regression results of the annual returns on the current and future earnings. Panel A shows the results of pooled regressions, while Panel B provides the Fama-MacBeth regression results. The dependent variable
is the buy-and-hold return for year t, measured over the 12-month period ending three months after the firm's fiscal year-t end. CO measures the common ownership during year t. We use the five different proxies for common
ownership. Except for CrossDummy, CO is the decile score of the common ownership variables, scaled between zero and one. Each year, stocks are sorted based on their common ownership measures into deciles. Then, the decile
ranks are normalized on a scale of zero to one. CO Index is the average of all five proxies of common ownership. IO is the residual institutional ownership orthogonalized from the CO variables. Specifically, IO is obtained from the
residuals of the regression of total institutional ownership on Crossdummy and TotalCrossOwn. IO is also a decile rank, normalized between zero and one. Definitions of other explanatory variables are provided in Appendix A. Year
and Firm Fixed Effects are included in the pooled regressions. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses. The sample period is 1980–2014.
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Table A3: Variance Ratio Tests
Panel A: Annual Variance Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables CrossDummy NConnected NCross AvgNum TotalCrossOwn CO Index
CO -0.009 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
[-6.40] [-5.48] [-5.20] [-5.64] [-5.71] [-6.03]
Size -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018
[-18.53] [-18.58] [-18.64] [-18.63] [-18.57] [-18.42]
InvPrc -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[-2.34] [-2.34] [-2.35] [-2.34] [-2.35] [-2.34]
Amihud -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
[-0.47] [-0.47] [-0.48] [-0.47] [-0.47] [-0.47]
BidAsk Spread -0.214 -0.216 -0.216 -0.216 -0.215 -0.215
[-10.16] [-10.23] [-10.21] [-10.23] [-10.21] [-10.21]
BTM 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
[4.72] [4.74] [4.70] [4.73] [4.75] [4.80]
AnnRet -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
[-8.92] [-8.87] [-8.86] [-8.87] [-8.88] [-8.90]
Volatility 0.988 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.991 0.99
[9.67] [9.69] [9.69] [9.69] [9.68] [9.68]
Gross Profitability -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
[-3.83] [-3.80] [-3.82] [-3.80] [-3.83] [-3.82]
X -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[-1.42] [-1.42] [-1.42] [-1.42] [-1.43] [-1.43]
IO -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
[-5.41] [-4.97] [-4.86] [-4.99] [-5.15] [-5.36]
N 105,568 105,568 105,568 105,568 105,568 105,568
R2 35.4% 35.4% 35.4% 35.4% 35.4% 35.4%
Panel B: Quarterly Variance Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables CrossDummy NConnected NCross AvgNum TotalCrossOwn CO Index
CO -0.006 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 -0.010
[-6.21] [-5.46] [-6.66] [-5.26] [-6.40] [-6.24]
Size -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
[-19.11] [-19.17] [-18.87] [-19.32] [-18.94] [-18.95]
InvPrc -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[-2.47] [-2.46] [-2.48] [-2.46] [-2.48] [-2.47]
Amihud 4.395 4.378 4.403 4.366 4.413 4.403
[0.83] [0.83] [0.84] [0.83] [0.84] [0.83]
BidAsk Spread -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105
[-10.54] [-10.56] [-10.56] [-10.56] [-10.56] [-10.56]
BTM 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
[5.47] [5.46] [5.57] [5.42] [5.53] [5.53]
AnnRet -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[-3.98] [-3.97] [-4.00] [-3.96] [-4.01] [-3.99]
Volatility 0.702 0.703 0.702 0.703 0.702 0.702
[11.62] [11.62] [11.62] [11.62] [11.62] [11.62]
Gross Profitability -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
[-2.56] [-2.53] [-2.56] [-2.53] [-2.56] [-2.55]
X -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[-1.25] [-1.24] [-1.26] [-1.24] [-1.25] [-1.25]
IO -0.019 -0.018 -0.020 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019
[-8.78] [-8.39] [-9.01] [-8.29] [-8.88] [-8.81]
N 383,075 383,075 383,075 383,075 383,075 383,075
R2 12.6% 12.6% 12.6% 12.6% 12.6% 12.6%
This table reports the results of regression of variance ratios on the common ownership and control variables. The dependent variables are the variance ratios for year t, or the
ratios for the quarter q. The variance ratio is calculated from the natural logarithm of absolute value of the ratio of the variance of 5-day returns in a given quarter (resp., year) to
5 times the variance of one-day returns in the same quarter (resp., year). CO measures the common ownership during year t-1 (quarter q-1). We use the five different measures
of common ownership. Except for CrossDummy, CO is the decile score of the common ownership variables, scaled between zero and one. Each year (quarter), stocks are sorted
based on their common ownership measures into deciles. Then, the decile ranks are normalized on a scale of zero to one. CO Index is the average of all five proxies of common
ownership. IO is the residual institutional ownership orthogonalized from the CO variables. Specifically, IO is obtained from the residuals of the regression of total institutional
ownership on Crossdummy and TotalCrossOwn. IO is also a decile rank, normalized between zero and one. Definitions of other explanatory variables are provided in Appendix A.
Year and Firm Fixed Effects are included. t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses. The sample period is 1980–2014.
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Table A4: Cross-Sectional Analyses — Information Environment
Panel A: Earnings Informativeness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sort Variables Size Residual IO IVOL PIN InfoCost
CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index
Lagged X -0.101 -0.135 -0.167 -0.260 -0.102 -0.129 -0.467 -0.436 -0.047 -0.103
[-0.86] [-0.99] [-0.86] [-1.25] [-0.97] [-1.05] [-2.47] [-1.98] [-0.30] [-0.57]
X 0.764 0.705 0.979 0.905 0.668 0.661 0.730 0.693 0.491 0.313
[4.25] [3.44] [4.62] [3.95] [4.93] [4.14] [2.78] [2.27] [2.07] [1.20]
X3 0.060 0.089 -0.097 -0.076 0.033 -0.010 -0.250 -0.233 0.004 0.024
[0.85] [1.08] [-1.04] [-0.72] [0.62] [-0.16] [-2.46] [-1.93] [0.04] [0.22]
R3 -0.092 -0.105 -0.077 -0.083 -0.085 -0.089 -0.109 -0.115 -0.140 -0.148
[-4.88] [-4.71] [-3.69] [-3.33] [-4.94] [-4.04] [-7.21] [-5.34] [-8.18] [-7.34]
D 0.441 0.489 0.090 0.131 0.185 0.227 -0.139 -0.114 -0.038 -0.035
[19.43] [16.68] [4.15] [4.65] [12.94] [11.57] [-6.20] [-4.07] [-2.20] [-1.53]
Lagged X × D -0.217 -0.140 -0.113 0.000 -0.254 -0.190 0.173 0.169 -0.459 -0.526
[-2.48] [-1.21] [-0.79] [-0.00] [-3.30] [-1.81] [0.95] [0.77] [-2.80] [-2.54]
X × D -0.098 -0.045 -0.321 -0.249 -0.039 -0.067 0.004 0.110 0.507 0.455
[-0.85] [-0.29] [-1.94] [-1.29] [-0.43] [-0.51] [0.02] [0.41] [2.72] [1.69]
X3 × D -0.150 -0.233 -0.017 -0.105 -0.101 -0.081 0.129 0.077 0.033 0.067
[-2.92] [-3.49] [-0.22] [-1.15] [-2.39] [-1.40] [1.46] [0.70] [0.38] [0.57]
R3 × D 0.002 0.024 -0.004 0.004 -0.012 -0.011 0.023 0.027 0.012 0.027
[0.15] [1.23] [-0.24] [0.18] [-0.85] [-0.60] [1.45] [1.12] [0.64] [0.96]
CO 0.001 0.005 -0.016 -0.044 -0.028 -0.051 -0.060 -0.098 0.052 0.085
[0.11] [0.21] [-1.01] [-1.70] [-2.14] [-2.23] [-2.57] [-2.55] [3.02] [2.88]
Lagged X × CO 0.079 0.108 0.004 0.095 -0.031 -0.018 0.020 -0.046 -0.115 -0.089
[0.95] [0.82] [0.04] [0.54] [-0.44] [-0.15] [0.10] [-0.18] [-0.86] [-0.44]
X × CO -0.143 -0.142 -0.514 -0.470 -0.186 -0.238 -0.102 -0.084 -0.112 0.068
[-1.47] [-0.88] [-2.79] [-2.15] [-2.37] [-1.79] [-0.50] [-0.28] [-0.65] [0.26]
X3 × CO -0.056 -0.103 0.018 -0.025 0.128 0.194 -0.008 -0.034 -0.050 -0.071
[-1.09] [-1.30] [0.25] [-0.24] [3.38] [2.98] [-0.08] [-0.25] [-0.65] [-0.60]
R3 × CO 0.045 0.070 0.046 0.064 0.014 0.019 0.057 0.071 0.052 0.073
[3.42] [3.30] [3.13] [2.69] [1.08] [0.89] [2.98] [2.33] [3.73] [3.43]
D × CO -0.048 -0.131 -0.108 -0.180 -0.080 -0.153 0.077 0.032 0.035 0.027
[-2.15] [-3.65] [-4.67] [-5.09] [-4.16] [-5.03] [2.96] [0.80] [1.55] [0.79]
D × Lagged X × CO -0.386 -0.501 -0.310 -0.453 -0.238 -0.328 -0.291 -0.309 -0.122 -0.014
[-3.40] [-2.91] [-2.31] [-2.20] [-2.29] [-1.99] [-1.30] [-1.01] [-0.56] [-0.05]
D × X × CO -0.399 -0.389 0.114 0.057 -0.251 -0.139 -0.610 -0.823 -0.607 -0.596
[-2.88] [-1.85] [0.57] [0.22] [-1.91] [-0.70] [-2.30] [-2.32] [-2.18] [-1.74]
D × X3 × CO 0.231 0.371 0.164 0.329 -0.046 -0.074 0.260 0.369 0.191 0.145
[3.43] [3.68] [2.08] [2.74] [-0.74] [-0.78] [2.38] [2.37] [1.58] [0.83]
D × R3 × CO -0.041 -0.083 -0.040 -0.063 0.013 0.014 -0.072 -0.084 -0.007 -0.023
[-2.27] [-3.09] [-2.09] [-2.11] [0.68] [0.45] [-3.15] [-2.30] [-0.28] [-0.59]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 76,731 76,731 76,731 76,731 76,729 76,729 43,410 43,410 43,905 43,905
R2 31.4% 31.3% 30.0% 30.0% 30.3% 30.2% 34.3% 34.2% 35.4% 35.2%
Panel B: Variance Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sort Variables Size Residual IO IVOL PIN InfoCost
CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index
CO -0.006 -0.011 -0.005 -0.010 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.007
[-4.93] [-5.63] [-4.84] [-5.24] [-2.80] [-3.56] [-1.24] [-2.34] [-2.44] [-2.99]
D 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.007
[0.59] [0.01] [-1.56] [-1.02] [10.44] [8.12] [6.63] [4.75] [4.49] [3.82]
D × CO -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
[-1.00] [0.12] [-2.22] [-1.46] [-3.64] [-2.04] [-3.63] [-1.61] [-2.05] [-1.83]
Size -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 -0.008
[-17.89] [-17.79] [-18.98] [-18.83] [-18.41] [-18.29] [-12.58] [-12.43] [-10.82] [-10.65]
InvPrc -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.016
[-2.48] [-2.47] [-2.51] [-2.49] [-0.09] [-0.08] [7.96] [7.98] [5.77] [5.73]
Amihud 4.409 4.406 4.388 4.366 18.410 18.434 -4.780 -4.823 412.646 413.266
[0.84] [0.84] [0.83] [0.83] [3.64] [3.65] [-1.14] [-1.16] [3.87] [3.87]
BidAsk Spread -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.122 -0.123 -0.084 -0.084 -0.080 -0.080
[-10.54] [-10.56] [-10.54] [-10.56] [-11.81] [-11.83] [-8.89] [-8.90] [-9.13] [-9.15]
BTM 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004
[5.51] [5.52] [5.64] [5.63] [5.67] [5.63] [2.76] [2.79] [4.25] [4.34]
AnnRet -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
[-3.84] [-3.84] [-3.98] [-4.01] [-3.84] [-3.88] [-2.34] [-2.38] [0.43] [0.43]
Volatility 0.702 0.702 0.701 0.702 0.663 0.665 0.436 0.437 0.573 0.571
[11.62] [11.62] [11.61] [11.61] [9.64] [9.64] [7.81] [7.80] [9.94] [9.90]
Gross Profitability -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.006
[-2.56] [-2.55] [-2.54] [-2.56] [-2.32] [-2.36] [-2.45] [-2.44] [1.71] [1.74]
X -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.004
[-1.26] [-1.25] [-1.27] [-1.26] [-1.28] [-1.27] [-0.63] [-0.62] [-1.43] [-1.44]
IO -0.019 -0.019 -0.025 -0.025 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020
[-8.78] [-8.72] [-8.82] [-8.74] [-7.94] [-7.90] [-6.38] [-6.15] [-7.41] [-7.64]
N 383,075 383,075 383,075 383,075 374,598 374,598 223,717 223,717 207,574 207,574
R2 12.6% 12.6% 12.6% 12.6% 12.2% 12.2% 13.7% 13.7% 8.3% 8.3%
This table examines whether the effects of common ownership on the price informativeness varies according to firms’ informational environment. Panel A examines the price informativeness with respect to future
earnings, while Panel B uses quarterly variance ratios to study the extent to which share prices are influenced by noisy trading. A dummy variable, D, measures firms’ information environment. Specifically, D takes one
if a firm displays characteristics that are related to high information asymmetry. Each year (each quarter for Panel B), firms are sorted into two groups using the median values of Size, Residual Institutional Ownership
(IO), Idiosyncratic Volatility (IVOL), PIN, and Information Cost Index (InfoCost). Then, D equals one if a firm is small, has low Residual IO, high IVOL, high PIN, or high InfoCost. Finally, D is interacted with common
ownership variables to examine the differential effects of common ownership for each subsample of sorting variables. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Year and Firm Fixed Effects are included. t-
statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses. The sample period is 1980–2014.
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Table A5: Q-Investment Relation and Common Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables CAPXRND Investment RND DisExp
CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index CrossDummy CO Index
Q 0.810 0.773 0.877 0.900 0.430 0.425 0.533 0.543
[9.23] [7.09] [8.32] [6.63] [8.77] [6.73] [10.34] [8.26]
CO -1.163 -2.647 -1.318 -2.416 -1.134 -1.999 -1.138 -2.014
[-5.04] [-7.18] [-3.82] [-4.41] [-8.58] [-9.21] [-7.46] [-8.13]
Q × CO 0.238 0.281 0.186 0.109 0.143 0.134 0.119 0.080
[2.59] [1.96] [1.41] [0.52] [2.58] [1.54] [1.93] [0.84]
CF 11.314 7.907 17.309 13.686 2.094 0.070 2.905 0.728
[13.41] [7.55] [15.30] [9.58] [4.02] [0.11] [4.70] [0.92]
CF × CO 2.855 9.601 5.780 12.833 3.866 7.739 3.651 7.864
[2.96] [6.10] [4.42] [6.00] [6.17] [7.40] [5.12] [6.59]
INVAT 0.065 0.063 0.081 0.078 0.036 0.035 0.040 0.039
[9.05] [8.71] [8.44] [8.21] [8.71] [8.40] [8.72] [8.44]
R3 0.011 -0.002 -0.113 -0.125 0.224 0.216 0.268 0.259
[0.22] [-0.04] [-1.61] [-1.80] [7.21] [6.98] [7.72] [7.51]
CASH -1.102 -1.100 -0.016 -0.013 -1.154 -1.157 -1.283 -1.285
[-5.64] [-5.63] [-0.06] [-0.05] [-8.69] [-8.72] [-8.53] [-8.55]
LEV -6.638 -6.633 -11.651 -11.630 -1.684 -1.672 -2.133 -2.118
[-18.08] [-18.08] [-19.48] [-19.45] [-7.76] [-7.71] [-8.43] [-8.38]
SALEG 0.240 0.233 0.397 0.391 -0.058 -0.063 0.016 0.011
[2.38] [2.31] [2.86] [2.81] [-0.92] [-1.01] [0.23] [0.15]
Tangibility 11.962 11.945 11.658 11.627 1.638 1.620 1.824 1.806
[22.54] [22.57] [15.68] [15.65] [6.87] [6.80] [6.33] [6.28]
IO -1.068 -1.327 -0.216 -0.367 -1.302 -1.420 -1.347 -1.462
[-4.03] [-4.80] [-0.53] [-0.88] [-7.87] [-8.11] [-6.90] [-7.12]
KZ4 -0.009 -0.008 0.151 0.151 -0.023 -0.023 -0.029 -0.030
[-0.19] [-0.17] [2.08] [2.08] [-0.86] [-0.86] [-0.82] [-0.84]
N 71,464 71,464 72,198 72,198 72,198 72,198 72,198 72,198
R2 70.3% 70.4% 48.4% 48.4% 83.9% 83.9% 81.7% 81.7%
This table shows the regressions of various corporate investment proxies on Q and its interaction with common ownership variables. We use
CAPXRND, Investment, RND, and DisExp as the dependent variables. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of total assets minus
book value of equity, scaled by book value of total assets. All independent variables are measured at t-1, except CF, R3, and KZ4, which are
contemporaneous with the dependent variables. Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A. Year and Firm Fixed Effects are included.
t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm level and reported in parentheses. The sample period is 1980–2014.
